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My considered opinion is that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any
circumstances whatsoever. It violates the fundamental principles of international law, and
represents the very negation of the humanitarian concerns which underlie the structure of
humanitarian law. It offends conventional law and, in particular, the Geneva Gas Protocol
of 1925, and Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations of 1907. It contradicts the
fundamental principle of the dignity and worth of the human person on which all law
depends. It endangers the human environment in a manner which threatens the entirety of
life on the planet.
I regret that the Court has not held directly and categorically that the use or threat of use
of the weapon is unlawful in all circumstances without exception. The Court should have
so stated in a vigorous and forthright manner which would have settled this legal question
now and forever.
-Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion, International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on The
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'
In my view, it is wholly incoherent in the light of the material before the Court to say that
it cannot rule definitively on the matter now before it in view of the current state of the
law and because of the elements of facts at its disposal, for neither the law nor the facts
are so imprecise or inadequate as to prevent the Court from reaching a definitive
conclusion on the matter. On the other hand, the Court's findings could be construed as
suggesting either that there is a gap, a lacuna, in the existing law or that the Court is
unable to reach a definitive conclusion on the matter because the law is imprecise or its
content insufficient or that it simply does not exist. It does not appear to me any new
principles are needed for a determination of the matter to be made. All that was requested
of the Court was to apply the existing law. A finding of non liquet is wholly unfounded in
the present case. The Court has always taken the view that the burden of establishing the
law is on the Court and not on the Parties.
-Judge Koroma, Dissenting Opinion, International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on The Legality
of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons2
I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the end of the twentieth century, a remarkable yet
extraordinarily tragic and bloody century, we are given to flashbacks of events
of truly millennial salience, among them the Manhattan Project and the
development of the atom bomb. The image of a mushroom cloud of immense
destructive capacity is complemented by the knowledge that under that cloud
were the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first victims of the atomic
age. The disturbing image of a vaporized human being etched in rock near the
epicenter of the bomb blast in Hiroshima remains a permanent legacy of the
human impact of an atomic blast. This is an image that both rivets and
disturbs those who now visit the bomb site. It is a haunting and disturbing
warning about the threat posed by nuclear weapons; a threat that bespeaks
vaporized humanity as a casualty of thermonuclear war.3
1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 433 (July 8)
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 557-58 (Koroma, J., dissenting).
3. In 1991 the author visited Japan as part of a U.S. delegation of Amnesty International to
attend an International Council Meeting of the organization. As part of this visit, the author was asked to
give a public lecture on the question of human rights and the problems of nuclear arsenals. Winston
Nagan & Francis McCarthy, Hiroshima 1945-1995: Peace, Human Rights, and the Nuclear Weapons
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A tragic irony exists in the use of nuclear weapons on the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bombings occurred at the end of a war in which
the aggressor states (Germany and Japan) were frequently charged with the
most flagrant violations of the rules relating to the ius ad bellum and the ius in
bello.4 Nazi and Japanese aggression was expressed as conquest and fueled
claims that the rules that seek to restrain war, as well as the conduct of war,
were obsolete. The Axis powers were thought to use the idea of "total war" as
a stratagem for world domination and conquest. The irony lies in the fact that
nuclear weapons were first used by the Allied Powers, and these weapons now
represent forms of total war far in excess of what the Axis powers might have
imagined. The use of these weapons apparently did not permit the use of
reasoned judgment based on the traditional legal values (i.e., the principles of
necessity, proportionality, or humanitarianism) embedded in the ius in bello.
The irony is heightened when we view the situation in hindsight. The
processes of war and humanitarian disaster that characterized World War II
provided an immense impetus for the creation of a rule of law for global
society based on firm international constitutional precepts. The instrument for
world order, which became the foundation for the organization of
international society, was the United Nations Charter. The core constitutional
values of the Charter arose out of a desire to ban aggressive war and to
vigorously integrate rules of humanitarianism with a renewed interest in the
moral and juridical status of basic, universal human rights.5
The regime created under the Charter system was further enhanced by
the United Nations's affirmation of the Nuremberg convictions.6 These
convictions were a vigorous assertion of the vitality of ius in bello and ius ad
bellum. The principles emphasized at Nuremberg incorporated not only state,
but also individual, responsibility. The evolution of international law through
Nuremberg and the Charter system stands today in stark contrast to the threat
Crisis, Address before the Hiroshima Adoption Group of Amnesty International (Aug. 8, 1991) (on file
with The Yale Journal of International Law). The speech was subsequently revised in 1995 with the
assistance of Francis McCarthy. The author also visited the epicenter of the bomb site. In the speech, the
author suggested that it would have been appropriate for the U.S. government to express some form of
apology for its use of the bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such an apology, he believed,
would not detract from other wrongs done by all participants during World War II.
4. For an overview from the perspective of a military lawyer on the law of armed conflict,
see A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATrLIuELD (1996). For an overview of the use of force in
international relations, with a specific emphasis on the precepts relating to the initiation of coercion, see
NATIONAL SEcURTrrY LAW 85-191 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). This section of the work
covers issues relating to the basic framework of the U.N. Charter, the problems of intervention, the
issues reflecting traditional customary law principles, the role of self-defense, humanitarian law, and the
problems of internal conflict. For an overview of the literature relating specifically to law and nuclear
weapons, see id. at 485-668. On ius in bello and ius ad bellum, see THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS
ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
5. See U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
6. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 1144, U.N. Doe. A/236 (1946).
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posed by the weapons of mass destruction that now threaten the survival of
humanity and civilization.
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory
opinion on the lawfulness of the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons. 7 The
impetus for the opinion came from an unlikely source: the World Assembly of
the World Health Organization (WHO).8 The WHO's request was
accompanied by a similar request from the U.N. General Assembly.9 Coming
at the threshold of the millennium, the opinion represents a milestone in the
international law-discourse about nuclear weapons. The opinion of the ICJ
represents the complexities inherent in the framing of a proper juridical role
for the court. This general issue, seen from the perspectives of both majority
and dissenting views, is an important discourse that may transcend the
definition and boundary of the proper role of the ICJ, and speaks to a larger
and indeed vital question: the nature, role, and even identity of the future
international lawyer. Obviously, the opinion does not address this question
directly. However, when the opinion is seen within the broader context of the
development of international law since 1945, this central issue permeates the
discourse about the lawfulness of the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons.
The issue about the nature, role, and identity of the future international
lawyer is inextricably tied to one of the most important judicial questions in
the Grotian tradition of modern international law.10 This is the problem of
law's appropriate relation to state power and the extent to which law and legal
culture might constrain the exercise of power through reasoned elaboration,
understanding, and intervention. In short, the advisory opinion raised a
7. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). For an
assessment of the opinion's impact, its political import, and its pedagogic salience, see Richard A. Falk,
Nuclear Weapons, International Law, and the World Court: A Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64
(1997). Falk sees the advisory opinion in a positive light. See id. at 75. Falk concludes that the court's
decision is a plausible construct of international law, but not the "only plausible" conclusion. Id. at 73;
see also Judith Hippler Bello & Paul C. Szasz, Addendum: The Vote in the General Assembly, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 133 (1997) (questioning the ICJ's jurisdiction to hear the case); Judith Hippler Bello & Peter H.
Bekker, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (1997) (summarizing
the ICJ opinion).
8. See World Health Assembly Res. 46.40, WHO 46th Ass., 13th mtg. (1993). For a detailed
analysis of the background of the WHO request, see Nicholas Rostow, The World Health Organization,
The International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 151 (1995). See also
Peter Weiss et al., Draft Memorial in Support of the Application by the World Health Organization for
an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons under International Law, Including the W.H.O. Constitution, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 721 (1994) (arguing that the use of nuclear weapons breaches the WHO Constitution). On the
dismissal of the WHO's request, see Bello & Szasz, supra note 7, at 134-38.
9. See G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/49/49
(1995).
10. Hugo de Groot, more popularly known as Grotius, is regarded as the father of modem
international law. The landmark work for which he is justly honored is De Jure Belli ac Pacs. HUao
GRoTms, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS [THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1925) (1625). In the context of emerging conceptions of self-determined sovereignty,
Grotius sought to develop a coherent conception of an international community subject to the rules of
reason and law. The Grotian tradition is commonly seen as providing a compelling juridical basis for the
idea of a comprehensive legal obligation predicated upon a rule of law and founded on principles of
reason, rationality, and moral ordering. See H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law,
23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 18-21 (1946).
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threshold question of whether matters of national security-within which are
strategically deployed nuclear arsenals-are political and hence beyond the
cognizance of the institutional constraints of juridical elaboration and
normative guidance.
The remainder of this Essay is split into five parts. Part H examines the
conflicts inherent in international law, nuclear weapons, and national security.
It then explores the role of international lawyers in the post-Cold War nuclear
age. Part III outlines the evolution and structure of the discourse about the
legal status of nuclear weapons, looking first at problems emerging from both
the use and testing of nuclear weapons. Then, it explores the role small states
have played in this discourse through their development of nuclear weapon-
free zones. Part IV examines the conceptual basis of the treaty-based regime
relating to nuclear weapons as it relates to the legal expectations of the key
nuclear powers, as well as the conceptual basis of the treaty regime of
nonproliferation. Finally, Part V analyzes the advisory opinion against the
background of preexisting law and seeks both to defend the role of the court
and to give support to the explicitly Grotian-influenced analysis of
international law provided by Judge Weeramantry's dissent. Here the analysis
focuses on the dissenting Judge's interpretation of the key concepts
underlying the international constitutional system and the implications for
continued discourse on this vital issue. Part VI concludes.
II. FOCUSING THE INQUIRER'S LENS: LAW, SECURITY, AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
A. Law and the Arms Race in Conflict"
The end of World War II saw the world with a single nuclear power-
the United States. The detonation of bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
symbolically ended the age of conventional war and began the age of nuclear
weapons. In the ensuing distribution of nuclear power, Stalin's Soviet Union
made great efforts to match the nuclear capability of the United States. This
resulted in what is commonly called the "arms race," an important by-product
of the Cold War.'
2
The arms race resulted in the vast growth of the nuclear arsenals of the
Great Powers. Against this reality, two competing paradigms emerged. The
first emphasized national self-defense, justifying the balance of nuclear terror
and evolving into the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).' 3 The
11. The ethical and moral aspects of international relations and world order are analyzed in
POLITICAL REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL MORALITY: ETHICS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 11-75 (Kenneth
Kipnis & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987) [hereinafter POLITICAL REALISM].
12. See generally HERBERT F. YORK, RACE TO OBLIVION: A PARTICIPANT'S VIEW OF THE
ARMS RACE (1970) (detailing the absurdity of the arms race from an insider's perspective).
13. On the morality of nuclear deterrence, see POLITICAL REALISM, supra note 11, pt. 2, at
105-80 (collecting essays on the ethics of nuclear deterrence). Especially relevant are the essays of
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second paradigm emerged from an appreciation of the threat nuclear weapons
posed to the survival of humanity. This paradigm emphasized the need for
international regulation and progressive disarmament.
The testing, production, deployment, and possible use of nuclear
weapons became the exclusive province of national sovereigns, giving
primary decision-making responsibility to the national security specialists.
Even as other agencies of international decision-making, such as the U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council, became concerned about the nuclear
weapons issue, a relatively discrete set of treaty-based perspectives (such as
the Test Ban Treaty' 4) began to emerge based primarily on the understandings
of those states who monopolized nuclear weapons arsenals. However, the
general framework of international legal perspectives remained in some
measure insulated from the lex specialis generated by the expectations of the
"nuclear club." This in turn created an incentive on the part of non-nuclear
powers to join the "club," a fact that ushered in the nightmare scenario of the
uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. States wanting to join the club
would invoke the ritual words that their bomb was for "peace."
The evolution of this lex specialis arises in tension with the principles
embodied in the U.N. Charter. In particular, the efforts to outlaw aggression,
the international regulation of the deployment of armed forces, and
developments in humanitarian law, human rights, and environmental law
posed a distinctive challenge to the superpower-conditioned treaty-based
regime. All these developments evolved under the brooding omnipresence of
the nuclear mushroom cloud.15
It is widely recognized today that disarmament as a policy of
international law is an important strategic way to promote peace and security.
For example, this principle was instrumental in both the Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks process and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.1 6 It is also
accepted that nuclear deterrence as an instrument for maintaining a balance of
terror to ensure peace and security has become discredited."7 The critical task
Leslie Pickering Francis, Nuclear Threats and the Imposition of Risks, in POLITICAL REALISM, supra
note 11, at 153, and Richard Werner, The Immorality of Nuclear Deterrence, in POLITICAL REALISM,
supra note 11, at 158.
14. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313,480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963).
15. The mushroom cloud has itself been a symbol of controversy. It has been conventionally
viewed as a symbol of the prospect of human extinction. However, it has also been seen as a cloud of
peace. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & ERIC MARKUSEN, THE GENOCIDAL MENTALITY: NAZI HOLOCAUST
AND NUCLEAR THREAT 51 (1990) ("This great iridescent cloud and its mushroom top ... is actually a
protective umbrella that will forever shield mankind everywhere against the threat of annihilation in any
atomic war." (quoting William Laurence, U.S. government spokesperson for the hydrogen bomb
project)).
16. For a summary of the SALT process and the ABM Treaty, see John B. Rhinelander, Arms
Control in the Nuclear Age, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 4, at 551, 587-602. For an
appreciation of the movement toward reduction of nuclear arsenals and the principles involved in
facilitating this process, see Ronald F. Lehman II, Measures to Reduce Tension and Prevent War, in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 4, at 641.
17. See LIFTON & MARKUSEN, supra note 15, at 1-8; cf. Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 821, 108 Stat 507, 508-11 (1994) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 6303 (,Vest Supp. 1998)) (giving the U.S. President authority to impose sanctions on countries that
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for international lawyers is to structure an informed discourse in which the
strategies, tactics, and fundamental principles of security, peace, and
disarmament might be more effectively implemented in accordance with the
promise of the U.N. Charter. It will therefore be useful to review the legal
odyssey that international lawyers have traveled to determine what practical
suggestions might emerge to secure the banishment of nuclear weapons.
B. International Lawyers and the Nuclear Age
On August 6, 1995, the world celebrated the fiftieth "jubilee" of the
atom bomb's use on a human population.' 8 In that same year, the world also
celebrated the fiftieth Jubilee of the International Court of Justice. 19 These
separate, but not unrelated, events posed a problem of the most profound
importance for world order. The bomb was and continues to be an expression
and projection of power in international relations. The ICJ, through the
process of deliberation and adjudication, was and continues to be an
expression of reason in world order. At whatever level we conceptualize law,
the ICJ's most fundamental challenge is one of making power and expediency
subject to the rule of reason and the rule of law.
Since the momentous events of 1945, the most crucial, defining element
of international relations has been the production, distribution, and threatened20
use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, while the promise of a new world order was
spread nuclear weapons technology).
18. On August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb was first dropped on the city of Hiroshima. More
than 66,000 deaths were a direct result of the explosion and fire storm. About 80 percent of the
structures in Hiroshima were destroyed. The energy released from the bomb is estimated to have been
equivalent to that released from the explosion of 14,000 tons of TNT. See YORK, supra note 12, at 27.
See generally KENZABURO OE, HIROSHIMA NOTES (David L. Swain & Toshi Yonezawa trans., 1995)
(presenting the thoughts and reflections of eyewitnesses to the Hiroshima explosion); PACIFIC WAR
RESEARCH SOCIETY, THE DAY MAN LOST: HIROSHIMA, 6 AUGUST 1945 (1972) (providing a detailed
account of the events leading up to the detonation). On the medical effects of radiation from the
bombing of Hiroshima, see WILLIAM J. SCHULL, SONG AMONG THE RuINS (1990). For information on
the decision to use the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, see J. Samuel Walker, The Decision to Use the
Bomb: A Historiographical Update, 14 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 97 (1990).
19. On the history of the ICJ, see ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, 1946-1996 (1996); FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Vaughan Lowe &
Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996); INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (Connie Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); and THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS
FUTURE ROLEAFTERFIFY YEARS (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997).
20. See LIPTON & MARKUSEN, supra note 15, at 2 ("As we enter the last decade of this
century, almost everybody is aware that nuclear weapons pose unprecedented peril."). Liflon and
Markusen analogize the growth of nuclear arsenals to the growth of a global genocidal system. The
process of building nuclear arsenals is based upon justifications that are not compelling, but if war
scenarios are implemented based on these weapon systems, we may reasonably contemplate the end of
human life on this planet. Thus, their book is about:
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being implemented around the principles and policies of the U.N. Charter, the
nuclear age presented a critical and continuing challenge to the inherent or
fundamental promise of the Charter itself: that states, large and small, would
have their sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence
respected and secured by law. 1 At the same time, the principal body charged
with securing international security, the Security Council, would have to come
to terms with a regime dominated by the threats and counter-threats of a
nuclear weapons-dominated arms race.
The key Charter expectations based on security, sovereignty, and self-
determined independence soon came under pressure from the establishment of
competing zones of security established by the hegemonic distribution of
power during the Cold War.23 In the United States, foreign policy was
premised upon the containment of Communism (the
Truman/Eisenhower/Kennedy doctrines). 24 Later, the U.S. doctrine of security
was dominated by the doctrine of status (d6tente) (the Kissinger-Nixon
the threat nuclear weapons pose to the human future, about the cast of nind that created
and maintains the threat, and about an alternative, hopeful direction. In its exploration of
the sequence from a genocidal mentality to a species mentality, the book first confronts
the general nature of nuclear entrapment and then seeks insight from a major genocide
that has already taken place.
Id. at 1.
21. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
22. Since the five permanent members of the Security Council have the competence to
exercise a veto over matters affecting issues of international peace and security otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the Security Council, it is obvious that the Council's role in seeking to control and
regulate nuclear weapons threats would be dependent upon forging a consensus among the permanent
members of the Council. An important reflection of that emerging consensus is indicated in its statement
of January 31, 1992 in which the Council stated, inter alia, that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security." U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th
mtg., at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (1992). In effect, the Council was asserting its authority under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter with respect to weapons of mass destruction. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
23. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 175-88 (1981) (collecting materials on the legal justifications for
superpower interventions during the Cold War); see also Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell,
The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1959)
(examining the dynamics of social "areas"); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Process of Effective
Power: The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 353 (Myres S. McDougal &
W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985) (discussing power in the world order). For an overview of the
divergent models seeking to explain the relationship of security doctrines to world order, see Inis L.
Claude Jr., Theoretical Approaches to National Security and World Order, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW,
supra note 4, at 31-44. Claude discusses four dominant approaches: balance of power, collective
security, world federalism, and functionalist approaches. See id. at 33-44. For an integration of the
diverse approaches to the problem of security and world order, with a specific emphasis upon the global
process of effective power, see Myres S. McDougal, Law And Power, 46 A. J. INT'L L. 102, 102-14
(1952).
24. The Truman Doctrine defined American foreign policy as the containment of the
perceived expansionist goals of the Soviet Union. See Harry S Truman, The Truman Doctrine, in 2
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY SINCE 1898, at 525 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds.,
1988) (reprinting President Truman's Mar. 12, 1947 message to Congress). This policy of containment
continued during the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. See Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Eisenhower's Security Program-Executive Order 10450, in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY SINCE 1898, supra, at 582 (reprinting Exec. Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953)). For an
overview of relevant security doctrines, see Winston P. Nagan, Economic Sanctions, U.S. Foreign
Policy, International Law and The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 85, 138-53 (1988).
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doctrine),25  and, in more recent times, the "from containment to
encroachment" doctrine of the Reagan era.26 The Soviet Union claimed the
right to exercise influence over security zones contiguous to its territory,
effectively extending its land border to prevent an invasion from the west.27 It
also claimed, under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the right to defend the gains of
international socialism.28 Despite ideological divisions, both sides found the
power necessary to sustain these claims in the nuclear capacities of each bloc.
Indeed, the zones in effect established a so-called "nuclear umbrella." The
nuclear weapons-dominated arms race developed dramatically under a regime
that sanctioned the production, testing, distribution, and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
This Cold War order was often described as a bipolar distribution of
power. Such a model was not compatible with the general architecture of a
system premised upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Some
sovereignty and some equality were to be sacrificed at the altar of
international security claims by the superpowers that dominated this bipolar
structure. The Cold War and the principles of political hegemony that it
produced provided a powerful challenge to the U.N. Charter and to the
lawyers who sought to sustain its principles. In short, this Cold War order
forced the consideration of whether the Charter was undergoing a silent
revision and whether these silent revisions of the Charter undermined the very
concept of the international rule of law embedded in the Charter.
29
25. See Nagan, supra note 24, at 140. President Nixon and his national security advisor,
Henry Kissinger, developed a new approach to Soviet relations designed to relax the tensions between
the superpowers. In 1969, Nixon officially labeled this approach "detente." See CHARLES W. KEGLEY,
JR. & EUGENE R. WITrKOPF, WORLD POLITICS: TREND AND TRANSFORMATION 79 (3rd ed. 1989). In
order to relax the tensions, Nixon and Kissinger developed a "linkage theory" to develop economic,
political, and strategic ties to bind the nations in a common fate. Id. The theory was based on the idea
that the dependencies that resulted from such linkages would reduce the superpowers' incentives for
war.
26. See Nagan, supra note 24, at 145-56.
27. This behavior grew out of the Soviet Union's World War H experience: the traumatic
event of Nazi invasion from the west. See ALEXANDER WERTH, RUSSIA AT WAR: 1941-45 (describing
the invasion).
28. See PETER ZWICK, SOvIETFOREIGN RELATIONS: PROCESS AND POLICY 92 (1990).
29. The tension between the technological advances of nuclear weapons and the U.N. Charter
is indicated in Dulles's idea that the Charter was "a pre-atomic age" constitution; it was, he held:
obsolete before it actually came into force. As one who was at San Francisco, I can say
with confidence that if the delegates there had known that the mysterious and
immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass destruction, the
provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments
would have been far more emphatic and realistic.
John Foster Dulles, The Challenge of Our Time: Peace with Justice, 38 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1066 (1953).
This view lends credence to the view that the atom bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may simply
have been seen as very, very big bombs but, essentially, still conventional bombs. See W. Michael
Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171 (1988); see also Alvin M. Saperstein, The
"Long Peace": Result of Bipolar Competitive World?, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68 (1991) (modeling the
stability and predictability of bipolar and tripolar world orders and applying that analysis to the Cold
War system); Raimo Viiyrynen, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Domestic Political Systems, 32 J. PEACE
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The important questions on the role of law were as follows:
(1) the nature of the forces seeking to entrench and expand hegemonic
influence under the nuclear umbrella;30
(2) the fundamental principles of international constitutional law governing
such matters as self-determination and sovereign equality versus
volitional or non-volitional submission to the needs of power in a bipolar
world;31 and
(3) securing genuine independence and sovereign integrity under the
Charter.
32
A question left unresolved by international lawyers was whether the
bipolar world ultimately could be consistent with the letter and the spirit of the
U.N. Charter. These questions arose in the ICJ litigation concerning the U.S.
intervention in Nicaragua.33 There, the court rejected "the justification of
collective self-defence maintained by the United States of America in
connection with . . .militarily and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua." 34 Thus, the ICJ essentially sought to limit large states' right to
intervene in small states even if justified by Cold War exigencies relating to
national security. Here the court's interpretation of the Charter is consistent
with the original object and purpose of the instrument. But the losing party in
that litigation-the United States-is the power that now constitutes itself as
the major power in a unipolar world. That power indicated its displeasure at
REs. 361 (1995) (discussing the increasing importance of domestic factors with the erosion of bipolarity
in international relations); Thomas J. Volgy & Larry W. Imwalle, Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives
on the New World Order, 39 AM. . POL. Sci. 819 (1995) (providing an analysis of the "new world
order" after the Cold War and the bipolar balance of power structure).
30. The simplicity of this-question belies the complexity it provokes for understanding world
order during the Cold War period. The central national security doctrines of the major powers, such as
the Nixon Doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine, reflected a complex assessment of whether the
superpowers were using the nuclear umbrella for imperialism or for security. Further complications
involved the emergence of a group of so-called "non-aligned states" and of movements of national
liberation. For an overview of these complexities, see W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global
War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973). Reisman's principal thesis is that the
global war system comprises many more actors than simply nation states, and that realism demands that
these actors be accounted for if world order is to respond realistically to the problems of violence in the
world order. See also McDougal et al., supra note 23; Myres S. McDougal et a., The World Community:
A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988) (arguing that a more realistic conception
of world order must include a more complete map of the entire planetary social process from which the
problems involving violence often emerge).
31. An effort to understand the emerging constitutional law system as a process influenced by
the complexities of global power and social processes is found in Myres S. McDougal et al., The World
Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative Decision, 91 .LEGAL EDUc. 253 (1969).
32. A major purpose of the U.N. Charter is expressed in Article 2(4): "All members shall
refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
para. 4; see also id. art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its members.").
33. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
1.0.J. 1 (June 27).
34. Id. at 146.
the Nicaragua ruling and has not honored its terms.35 Additionally, the United
States has also declined to continue its consent lo the compulsory jurisdiction
of the court.
The court may have had a sixth sense in the Nicaragua case about
projected historical trends. The changes in world order since 1989 have been
of millennial importance. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia into clusters of new states, the fall of apartheid in South Africa,
the fall of Mobutu's Zaire,36 and the re-emergence of civilian democratic rule
in Nigeria 37 have generated a renewed interest in the Charter's original object
and purpose as the organizing instrument of constitutionality-directed world
order principles.38 The ICJ's role reaffirms a' durable constitutional
architecture for international order as we approach the twenty-first century.
However, we must not forget the limitations that the Cold War placed upon
the role and relevance of such international constitutional perspectives against
the actual operations of international power politics. In short, the conflict
between law (the domain of the lawyer) and power (the domain of the national
security specialist) was an acute one and a basic test of the rule-of-law
foundations of international order.
Indeed, in this post-Cold War period, we are still confronted with the
problem of nuclear weapons and the residue of expectations, claims, and
deployments that have survived the Cold War. How far and to what extent are
the production and distribution of nuclear weapons capabilities regulated by
general international law? How far and to what degree has treaty law
influenced the evolution of international law standards of general prescriptive
force in the control and regulation of nuclear weapons? What precisely are the
roles of the international lawyer and the ICJ in this process as we approach the
twenty-first century?
35. See US. Vetoes UN. Slap at Contra Aid, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1986, at 2C; United
Nations: Assembly Urges US. Compliance with World Court, Inter Press Serv., Nov. 3, 1986.
36. For an account of Mobutu's fall, see Bob Drogin & Mary Williams Nash, President of
Zaire Flees Capital, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1997, at Al.
37. See Anton La Guardia, International: Ex-General Declared President in Nigeria, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 2, 1999, at 13.
38. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (Ronald Cohen et al. eds.,
1993) (suggesting that new thinking is required to reshape the process of African governance and
African public order). The interdependence of political and constitutional development and economic
development for the further enhancement of sustainable public order in Africa is indicated in Emerging
Africa, THE ECONOMIST, June 14, 1997, at 13 (emphasizing the inportance of economic development in
Africa).
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IlI. THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO NUCLEAR
ARSENALS
A. The Use of Nuclear Weapons
In 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the atom bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was a multi-forum debate in the United States
about the history and morality of the use of the atom bomb.39 The question at
the heart of this national debate was whether the United States was wrong to
use the bomb on a human population.40 The debate in the United States
represented painful soul searching. The dominant view, which had been put
forward in the early postwar years, appeared to be that the bomb's use was
justified on the basis of projected casualties (both American and Japanese).4 '
An added assumption was that a continuation of the saturation bombing would
have exacted more Japanese casualties than the use of the atom bomb on two
Japanese cities.42
More skeptical views seemed to suggest that neither President Truman
nor his key advisors would have had time to actually understand and digest
the true nature of the bomb they were about to use.43 Even those who tested it
39. See, e.g., Henry Allen, The Gate of Hell; In Nagasaki in 1945, a Japanese Photographer
Recorded a Nightmare World, WASH. Posr, Oct. 21, 1995, at Hi; Mary Ficklen, Earning a Voice in
Bomb Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 1995, at 12C; see also Morton Keller, Amnesia Day,
NEw REP BLIC, Sept. 18-25, 1995, at 14-15. ("Remembrance of the Pacific war has been more
complicated. Liberal guilt over the bomb and more general regret at the internment of Japanese-
Americans has marred, for some, America's victory.").
40. It was a subtext of this debate that if the United States acknowledged that it was wrong,
the obvious implication would be that a national apology, however oblique and indirect, would be in
order. In a speech given in Hiroshima in August 1994, the author publicly called for an apology. See
supra note 3.
41. See HENRY L. STIMsoN & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR
631-33 (1948).
42. Professor Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, suggested in a speech that
perhaps the bomb might have been used with less lethal effects in the way of human casualties. For
example, detonation perhaps over Tokyo Bay and at a higher altitude might have made the political
point with more humane effects. My colleague, Professor Alex Greene (Department of Engineering,
University of Florida), in correspondence with Teller, indicated that detonation from a higher altitude
would have most certainly destroyed the aircraft carrying the bomb. Letter from Alex E. J. Greene,
Clean Combustion Technology Laboratory, University of Florida, Director Emeritus, Livermore
National Laboratory, Stanford University, to Edward Teller (Sep. 9, 1995) (on file with the author).
In general, the outcome of this national debate seemed to support the view indicated by Admiral
Nimitz, namely that the bomb's use reduced total casualties and possibly even Japanese casualties. See
Henry L. Stimson, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1947, at 97.
According to Admiral Nimitz's biographer:
Nimitz considered the atomic bomb somehow indecent, certainly not a legitimate form of
warfare. He hoped the Americans would not have to use it. He discussed the situation
with Captain Edwin Layton, who had devoted much of his adult life to the study of
Japanese psychology. Layton thought the dropping of the atomic bomb was a virtual
necessity. He pointed out, as he had often done before, that only the Emperor had the
prestige to make the Japanese stop fighting, and even for him it would be no easy thing.
E.B. POT-ER, NIMrrz 386 (1976). Layton also suggested that even if the Emperor ordered the Japanese
to stop, "the result might not be decisive unless he could prove to his people that the alternative was
indeed the destruction of Japan. The atomic bomb might provide that proof. Nimitz had come to the
same conclusion, but he wanted to hear it from his Japanese expert." Id.
43. See generally LAWRENCE S. WITrNER, ONE WORLD OR NONE: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD
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could not have fully appreciated what it would mean in actual use on a living
city. Other skeptical views held that the bomb's use essentially demonstrated
American power and signaled that Soviet expansion must cease. In short, the
bomb was the first offensive that launched the Cold War. The above-
mentioned issues are missing an element. That element is what international
lawyers, even in hindsight, can say about the use of the atom bomb in Japan.
44
The search for a justification by military leaders, moralists,45 and scientists
46
demonstrates the importance of other disciplines to this important question.
That is to say, the conversation about nuclear weapons should not be left
purely to the security establishment or the political establishment without the
benefit of other perspectives, including the legal perspective. In fact, the ICJ's
recent decision makes a vital contribution to deepening our understanding of
the normative priorities of, the strategic objectives of, and the way in which
effective decision-makers should rationally think about the nuclear weapons
problem. With this aside, we may tentatively ask the question about how we
can characterize the legality of the American use of the atom bomb in Japan.47
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT THROUGH 1953, at 33-35 (1993) (indicating that the weapon was
sufficiently new that its full implications could not be fully appreciated); Jordan J. Paust, The Nuclear
Decision in World War i1-Truman's Ending and Avoidance of War, 8 INT'L LAw. 160 (1974)
(providing an analysis of the decision to drop the bomb). This may be compared to President Truman's
justification for the use of the bomb. See Harry S Truman, Radio Report to the American People on the
Potsdam Conference (Aug. 9, 1945), in 1945 PUBLICPAPERS 202 (1961). According to Truman:
Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us
without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed
American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying the
international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in
order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.
Id. at 212.
44. For instance, Richard Falk states:
The use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was never evaluated in
relation to this international law framework by planners and leaders, nor has the
subsequent diplomacy of the nuclear age, which has included some twenty documented
threats to use nuclear weapons, been in any way sensitive to such legal criteria. In the
voluminous literature devoted to the Cuban missile crisis, only international lawyers have
regarded the international law dimension of the crisis as important, except as it was
considered in the detailed planning that was associated with the actual carrying out of the
strategic decision.
RIcHARD FALK, REVrrALIZING INTERNATONAL LAW 112 (1989).
45. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (W. Stein ed., 1961); see generally
POLITICAL REALISM, supra note 11.
46. See ATOMIC BoMB SCiENTnSTS: MEMOIRS, 1939-1945 (Joseph J. Ermene ed., 1989)
(detailing the role of scientists in the development of the atomic bomb). Joseph Rotblat is a physicist
who worked on developing the American atom bomb during and after World War II; he has become one
of the most outspoken critics of the development of nuclear technology and the philosophy of nuclear
deterrence. For example, Rotblat has criticized the underestimation of the risks of nuclear radiation. In
1981, he "embarrass[ed] the Government by saying its nuclear survival plans gave 'a false sense of
security."' Maurice Weaver, The Prize Man from Pugwash, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 14, 1995,
at 19.
47. The Shimoda case, a Japanese case, touches upon some aspects of such legality. See
Shimoda v. State, 355 HANREI iiiO [DEciSIONS BULLETIN] 17, reprinted and translated in 8 JAP. ANN.
INT'L L. 212,212-52 (1964); see also RICHARD A. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 374-413
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No definitive answers are possible in the positivist sense, but such an exercise
helps frame the legal discussion of the problem.
The first question that we confront is whether the bomb's use can be
justified by the principles of military necessity and the principles of
proportionality relating to the law of armed conflict. 4 8 A colorable case can be
made that the principles of military necessity do not serve as a justification for
the use of the bomb. On the other hand, given that the extent of the destruction
could not be foreseen, the principle of proportionality may weaken the
argument from necessity.
49
The question of whether' humanitarian principles should have
constrained the bomb's use is very compelling when we recognize that this
weapon does not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.
Additionally, the objectives of the bombing, even in proximity to a military
target, show virtually no regard for the effects on civilians50 and may have
even contemplated the shock value of the bomb as a stratagem to secure
unconditional capitulation. No hard and fast legal conclusions exist here.
These principles merely contemplate the use of legal tools that preexist the
bomb and work on the assumption that the decision-makers of the time must
have viewed the bomb not as sui generis, but rather as just a very, very big
bomb.
Another factor may be the "total war" ideas that influenced some
German and Japanese decision-makers. Allied reprisals (saturation bombing
of industrial targets) may have been seen as a justifiable response to the total
war concept, although this is an open, uneasy question."1 Both human rights
and environmental law concerns remained undeveloped in international law
until after the Second World War.52 While it may be said with the benefit of
hindsight that the bomb's use on a civilian population was morally wrong, the
legality of its use in 1945 may be more problematic. Furthermore, the issue of
(1968).
48. See Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and
Necessity, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39 (1992) (discussing alternative conceptions of proportionality
and necessity).
49. But cf. WITrNER, supra note 43, at 28 ('ronically, however, the military value of using
the bomb had dwindled considerably by mid-1945 and, for this reason, a small number of middle-
echelon U.S. government officials did question U.S. policy.").
50. See FALic, supra note 44, at 112 ("I[M]ilitary target' is given such a loose definition that it
includes everything pertaining to a war effort, even civilian morale ..... ).
51. For a discussion on saturation bombing of industrial targets during World War II, see
Tami D. Biddle, Air Power, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD, supra note 4, at 140, 151-54.
52. Many of the human rights and environmental law concerns were not addressed by
international law until after World War ii. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar.
5, 1970); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, (adopted June 16, 1972, by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973), U.N. Doc. AICONF. 48/14 at 2-65, and Corr. 1
(1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
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whether the United States retrospectively violated international law in 1945
remains debatable. To some, it obviously has; to others, this is a matter of
vigorous dispute. That this issue still tests the moral sensibility of all
Americans is unquestioned.
B. The Testing of Nuclear Weapons: The Testing-Ground of Legality in
International Law
The United States set the pace in the nuclear arms race with the
development of the hydrogen bomb.53 It may be parenthetically noted that
many nuclear powers do not wish to test weapons systems on the home
front.54 They are apparently concerned that tests would unnecessarily provoke
public disapproval.55 As such, the U.S. security establishment decided that the
hydrogen bomb would be tested on a number of islands in the South Pacific,
far from the U.S. mainland. The United States had acquired a trust
responsibility over these islands from the United Nations, and in exercise of
trust sovereignty, decided that it was appropriate to test those weapons there.56
The islands' civilian populations were small; the islands were far from any
population centers; and the projected impacts on the surrounding oceans were
deemed to be reasonable because ocean spaces for public safety were secured
by a process of warnings and explicitly defined safety zones.57 The test
explosion of March 1954 was grossly underestimated by U.S. scientists by
some fifty percent.58 American and Japanese sailors were injured; in the case
of the Japanese, the sailors aboard the vessel Fukuryu Maru were sailing clear
of the safety zone.59
53. See FALK, supra note 44, at 100 ("In essence, ever since the use of the atomic bomb at the
end of World War II, the U.S. government has insisted on retaining the nuclear option as an instrument
of state craft, especially in superpower relations.").
54. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 252 (Dec. 20).
55. See WrrNER, supra note 43, at 340 (discussing the growth of movements supporting
nuclear disarmament); Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site
(visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.clw.org/coalition/ctsuppor.htm>; Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers, Eight in Ten Voters Support Senate Approval of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (July 29, 1998)
(visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.clw.orgtcoalition/comborel.htm>; The Henry L. Stimson Center,
Public Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons: An Opportunity for Leadership (visited April 7, 1999)
<http.//www.stimson.org/policy/pollmemo.htm>.
56. See Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 648-49 (1955). According to McDougal and Schlei, "the U.N.
Security Council was advised by the United States that the atoll and its territorial waters had been closed
for security reasons, in accordance with Article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement, in order to enable the
AEC to conduct atomic tests." Id. at 651.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 652.
59. The U.S. trust was made up of 98 island groups comprised of approximately 2000 islands.
The area of land was about 846 square miles spread over some 300,000 square miles of ocean. The
United States entered into an agreement with the United Nations to administer this trust territory as a
strategic trusteeship arrangement on July 18, 1947. See Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese
Mandated Islands, Apr. 2, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 (entered into force July 18, 1947). In
terms of the trust arrangement, the United States informed the Security Council that the Bikini Atoll and-
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Injury to Japanese civilians lawfully using the high seas and the
displacement of island inhabitants precipitated specific claims under
international law that permitted a larger discourse about the role of
international lawyers and the problems of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the
legal issues in this case raised one phase of the nuclear problem: the testing of
nuclear weapons.
60
These issues were debated in diplomatic fora, at the United Nations, and
in reputable journals devoted to legal scholarship. In other words, decision-
making interventions such as adjudication, arbitration, and mediation or other
appropriate techniques for characterizing and deciding on the lawfulness of
the testing process were not central to this issue at this time. It was in the
arena of scholarly inquiry that a fuller appreciation of the nuclear issue as a
legal problem occurred and evaluations of the potential for a mature juridical
response to it ultimately emerged. For example, the Declaration on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons was adopted
by the General Assembly on November 24, 1961 .61 The Declaration itself
does not refer to scholarly works, but it recalls those international instruments
which sought to prohibit weapons of mass destruction because they cause
"unnecessary human suffering" and were thus prohibited because they are
"contrary to the laws of humanity and to the principles to international law."62
The Declaration then, under the considering paragraph, states that "the
use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would bring about indiscriminate
suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization to an even greater extent
than the use of those weapons declared by the aforementioned international
declarations and agreements to be contrary to the laws of humanity and a
crime under international law."63 It may thus be confidently asserted that the
scholarly discourse had drawn the attention of both political elites and
international opinion makers, so that the General Assembly declaration itself
is put in terms of the problems that nuclear weapons pose for international
law. Functionally, these insights included a discourse about the "policy
content" of inherited prescriptions, the problem of the control "intention" of
all relevant power-conditioned parties, and the nature and quality of the
surrounding seas had been closed for security reasons. The United States also advised shipping to avoid
an area of some 180,000 square miles. When the tests were projected for the area of Eniwetok, an area
of 30,000 square miles was indicated as the warning zone. See McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at
651. These zones were ultimately expanded to include an area of 400,000 square miles by 1954. See
Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.. 629, 632
(1955); McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 651 ("In March 1954, when it had become apparent that
the warning area then in effect was inadequate, it was extended to include a total area of approximately
400,000 square miles.").
60. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication,
Address Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 24, 1981), in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY CONVOCATION 101, 114 (1983).
61. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: BASIC DOCUMENTS,




complex "authority" signals about the necessity or the threats posed by
nuclear arsenals. 64 In effect, the nuclear arsenals issue presented an almost
ideal model for assaying the challenges inherent in the operational processes
of international lawmaking.
Scholars questioned the lawfulness of the U.S. testing program in the
South Pacific on the basis that it contravened certain provisions of the U.N.
Charter,65 that it was inconsistent with the customary law of the sea,6 and that
it was a violation of the Trusteeship Agreement.67 On the other hand,
McDougal and Schlei argued that the policy consequence of a legal constraint
on testing would amount to "unilateral disarmament" and an "attendant
invitation to destruction."6 8 They, therefore, called for a more careful
examination of the legal bases for the testing. They argued that the principal
objections to the testing did not adequately account for the law of self-
defense. They further argued that a careful, contextual appraisal of the
conditions of world order-subject to the standard of reasonable interpretation
of a number of intersecting legal prescriptions-suggested the lawfulness of
testing under international law. In short, they argued that the "full utilization"
gloss implicit in the freedom of the seas permitted a reasonable use of the
seas, and that promoting the security of the free world was just such a
reasonable use. They added that the dislocation of the indigenous inhabitants
was only a trivial issue when judged against the crisis of world order.
Therefore, the dislocation was a reasonable exercise of competence allocated
69in Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, 9 as well as Article 6 of the Trusteeship
64. See Reisman, supra note 60, at 113. The model is drawn from the notion that international
law, in order to count as law, must have a prescriptive policy content; must be accompanied by signs and
symbols indicating a widespread community acceptance in the sense that community is the basis for
authority in international law; and must be accompanied by some conception of efficacy, that is,
accompanied by some capacity of control to ensure that the prescribed law is real, and not simulated.
See id.
65. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 1, para. 2; id. art. 2, para. 3; id. art. 2, para. 4.
The allegations challenging the U.S. testing program under the Charter essentially claimed that the
testing program was not calculated to enhance peace and security, under Article 1(1), nor to prevent or
remove threats to peace or suppress acts of aggression, etc. The allegations with respect to Article 1(2)
claimed essentially that the testing program was not designed to enhance "friendly relations" among
nations nor did it respect the equal rights and self-determination of the populated groups effected. The
alleged violation of Article 2(3) suggested that the United States, by testing these nuclear weapons, was
settling its international disputes in a way that endangered international peace and security. With respect
to the alleged violation of Article 2(4), the claim represented a charge of attenuated aggression.
66. See Margolis, supra note 59, at 630-36. For a modem codification of the law of the sea,
see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982); see also
id. art. 23 (requiring ships carrying nuclear materials to observe "special precautionary measures"); id.
art. 141 (declaring that international waters are to be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes"); id. art.
146 (declaring that "necessary measures shall be taken to ensure effective protection of human life" in
international waters).
67. See Reisman, supra note 60, at 114; see also McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 654.
68. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 709.
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 73 (recognizing obligations of states administering non-self-governing
territories).
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Agreement (under which the United States undertook to secure the well-being
of the inhabitants in the trust area).7°
In the context of the temporary appropriation of vast tracts of ocean,
McDougal and Schlei argued that the evolution of rules governing the sea had
to accommodate the enormous corpus of ambiguous, contradictory, and
incomplete claims in a world lacking central decision-making structures of
authority and control. In this decentralized arena, decisions concerning the
legal regulation of the oceans were subject to the principle of state actors
being both claimants and deciiion-makers, the dedoublement fonctionnel. 71
Thus, the resolution and/or acceptance of such claims at law had to be subject
to reasonable interpretation, as it might appear to a disengaged third-party
appraiser. McDougal and Schlei quoted Professor H.A. Smith to support the
theory 'of interpretation that their view promotes:
The law of nations which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any visible authority
universally recognized, professes to be the application of reason to international conduct.
From this it follows that any claim [to assert power outside the three mile limit] which is
admittedly reasonable may fairly be presumed to be in accord with law, and the burden of
proving that it is contrary to the law should lie in the state which opposes the claim. 72
The gloss that McDougal and Schlei gave to Smith's view is that the general
"world order context of the Cold War" and the specific facts are the only
means by which the standard of reasonableness can be rationally applied to
the question of the lawfulness of testing thermonuclear weapons in the trust
areas of the South Pacific. The problem with the McDougal-Schlei analysis is
that when one juxtaposes the rules relating to the interpretation of the
trusteeship agreement and the law of the sea against a claim to survival based
on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,73 it would always appear to be "reasonable"
to secure the survival of the world by testing these weapons despite such
inconveniences. It should be noted, however, that their analysis downplays the
damage to the environment that ultimately occurred. The islands continue to
be contaminated by radiation, and the original inhabitants are unable to return.
The central issue is not whether these after-the-fact appraisals are right
or wrong. What is important is that the question of nuclear weapons, even if
only in the limited context of atmospheric testing, had become a central part
of international legal discourse, and, as such, had an important influence on
practical decision-makers and evolving international legal standards. An
illustration of law gravitating from the scholarly journals to law as an
70. See Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, supra note 59, art.
6.
71. The principle of the dedoublementfonctionnel, or duality of function, recognizes that tle
domestic decision-maker, in certain contexts, is also an international decision-maker. Hence, the
decision-maker may perform a double lawmaking function. The decision-maker participates from the
domestic point of view as a claimant and at the same time seeks to justify those claims on the basis of
criteria that would be acceptable to a hypothetical third-party international appraiser. For more on this
principle, see McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 23, at 13.
72. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 660 (quoting H.A. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM
OF THE SEA 20 (1950)).
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (guaranteeing the right to self-defense).
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expression of positive commitment emerged in the context of the 1963 Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water. 74 It is of course impossible to -trace exactly the way in which
opinion leaders and international elites began to specifically conceptualize the
nuclear threat from the point of view of international law and world order.
Certainly many voices have participated in the crystallization of
internationally sanctioned norms and standards relating to the control and
regulation of nuclear weapons.
However, the efforts of scholars in their important discourse to
appreciate the factual conditions and consequences for world order posed by
nuclear weapons systems and their deployment, as well as the effort to
provide a juridical framework within which the discourse might occur, must
be presumed to have influenced the emerging regimes relating to the legal
control of nuclear weapons. The 1963 treaty was entered into by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, the "original parties.'
'T
The treaty's major purpose was rooted in the broader process of attaining an
agreement on "general and complete disarmament." It was part of the
context of an objective to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time,"77 and its purpose was also tied to the objective
of putting an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive
substances.78
The other U.N. organs followed this cue and began to focus more
seriously on the larger problem posed by the production, deployment, and
even possible use of nuclear weapons. A good illustration is the General
Assembly resolution on the "urgent need for Suspension of Nuclear and
Thermonuclear Weapons., 79 The change of attitude and the United Nations's
seizure of the issue led to the promulgation of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).80 The treaty's central point was
obvious. Proliferation increased the possibility of nuclear war, and that
possibility-and the devastation that would ensue-was unacceptable. While
the Test Ban Treaty was an agreement between members of the "nuclear
club," this NPT represented the sentiments of the non-nuclear powers as well.
Under this treaty, the non-nuclear powers, not being members of the "club,"
would forego the opportunity to project either national power or prestige with
their own "bomb."
74. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under





79. G.A. Res. 2032(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Annexes (XX), Agenda Item 30, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A16124 (1965).
80. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 52.
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Among the major powers left out of the "club" was France. France
began testing weapons devices and, like the United States, it chose to do so far
from home. In fact, France's testing program was out in the South Pacific in
the Mururoa Atoll 6000 kilometers east of Australia. Australia instituted
proceedings against France in the ICJ.81 Australia requested that France
discontinue testing pending a judgment (of jurisdiction and the merits) by the
court.8 2 Although France did not argue in the interim measures phase of the
case, it sent a letter indicating that the testing issue was a matter of national
security and that the court was not competent to accept jurisdiction in this
case. The court ruled that it could not be presumed "a priori that all [of
Australia's] claims fall completely outside the Court's jurisdiction or that
Australia could not establish a legal interest regarding its claims."8 3 in
retrospect, as we shall see, the decision to provide interim measures was a
brave one.
During the interim period prior to the hearing on jurisdiction and the
merits, it was generally thought that the key players in the nuclear club would
have made their voices heard on this issue by supporting the Australian claim.
However, whatever noises were heard were tantamount to the sound of one
hand clapping. In its second opinion, the court declined to answer the question
that was the case's object and purpose; instead, the existence of a dispute no
longer existed because France had declared that its nuclear testing program in
the South Pacific was at an end. The court thus concluded that "no further
pronouncement [was] required in the ... case," stressing that it "does not
enter into the adjudicatory functions of the Court to deal with issues in
abstract."
84
Australia, in fact, wanted more than a cessation of French testing. It
claimed for itself and all other states a right to be free from atmospheric
nuclear tests.85 Still, the question remains why the court seemed to retreat
from the promise suggested in the interim measures phase of the proceedings.
Other would-be club members also began testing nuclear weapons, the
most notable of which was the People's Republic of China. It is, of course,
unclear exactly how many additional states can currently have a testing
capability within a short time if they so desire.86 Such possibilities underscore
81. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 98, 99 (June 22).
82. See id. at 100.
83. Id. at 103.
84. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 287 (Dec. 20).
85. See Nuclear Tests Case, 1973 I.C.J. at 103. For a discussion of recent developments on
this issue, see Bernard Edinger, Australia, France Bury Nuclear Test Hatchet, Reuters World Serv.,
Dec. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File, which noted that "After a
huge international campaign spearheaded by Australia and New Zealand, the tests were concluded ahead
of schedule in January. France has since committed itself to a global test ban." Id.; see also Ignace Dalle,
French Nuclear Body Will Leave Muroroa by End of Year, Agence Fr.-Presse, Dec. 17, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File (noting that Mururoa, "the site 18,000 kilometers
(12,500 miles) from Paris and 6,600 kilometers away from Los Angeles and Sydney, where France
conducted most of its nuclear tests, is slowly returning to its natural state").
86. Take, for instance, the case of South Africa, which was suspected to have nuclear
capability. In the late 1970s, a massive geophysical event occurred in the South Atlantic that some
believed was a nuclear test. See Inside South Africa's Atomic Laager, FIN. TIMSs (London), May 20,
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a critical threat to international order and security: the proliferation of nuclear
arsenals. This leads us into another important development among non-
nuclear powers.
C. Small Powers React: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
Regional nuclear-free zones have reflected one of the most important
developments in defining the expectations of non-nuclear powers, namely, the
forging of regional understandings. These agreements ensure that large areas
of the planet will be entirely free of nuclear weapons. Illustrations of these
agreements include the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),87 the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty,88 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,89 and the African Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).90 The proliferation of
nuclear-free zones, in some degree, is consistent with the policies in general of
nonproliferation. On the other hand, because they express policies that
fundamentally seek the complete eradication of nuclear weapons, these
treaties express an expectation that extends beyond the expectations of the
immediate parties to these instruments. For example, language in Article 1(2)
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco states, "The Contracting Parties also undertake to
refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or
1993, at 6; see also David Albright, South Africa and the Affordable Bomb, 50 DULL. ATOMIC
SCimNSTS 37, 42 (1994); Murrey Marder & Don Oberdorfer, How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S.
African A-Test, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1977, at Al (quoting a U.S. official, who said, "I'd say we were
99% certain that the construction was preparation for an atomic test").
There is considerable circumstantial evidence that South Africa is indeed a nuclear power. See
Jack Anderson, The Mystery Flash: Bomb or Phenomenon, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1980, at A25; Jack
Anderson, South Africa's Secret Uranium Process, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1980, at BI5; see also Caryle
Murphy, Embargo Slows South African A-Plans, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1980, at A24 (describing South
Africa's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). South Africa's "hint" that it was willing
to sign the nonproliferation pact is viewed as an important signal that it has a nuclear weapons
capability. See Ned Temko, S. Africa Signal on Nuclear Pact Suggests It Has Bomb, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MON., Sept. 29, 1987, at 9. See generally Albright, supra, (describing development of South Africa's
nuclear weapons program). F.W. de Klerk made an announcement in March 1993 that South Afica had
built a small, secret-nuclear arsenal-and then eliminated it. South Africa had kept its weapons
production infrastructure extremely secret. Later, a convicted Soviet spy, Commodore Dieter Gerhardt,
revealed that the 1979 flash was caused by an Israeli-South African test. See id. at 42. Since the demise
of apartheid, South Africa has been explicit in its support of a nuclear weapons-free Africa and a regime
of nonproliferation. See Albright, supra, at 37 (describing South Africa's accession to the
nonproliferation regime).
87. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281.
88. Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
(1995).
89. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, U.N. Doc. CD/633 (1985), 24
I.L.M. 1442 (1985) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986).
90. Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Text), Sept.
13, 1995, U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 426, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc A/50/426.
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in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production,
possession or control of any nuclear weapon." 91
There are three general facts about the nuclear weapon-free zone
regimes. First, in the aggregate, they represent a vast expanse of the human
population and the globe, expressing a specific desire for the eradication of
nuclear weapons. Second, these regimes indicate a very clear policy content
for the eradication of nuclear weapons; they carry a strong authority signal in
the sense that they are mandated by both their states and by the societies that
they represent. Third and most important, they carry an important element of
international lawmaking: a strong, controlled intention that carries a clear
principle, even if that principle is not yet universally established. In this sense,
the nuclear weapon-free zone regimes, as a whole, are powerful prescriptive
forces for moving in the direction of a categorical outlawing of nuclear
weapons.
There is one further point that may be made about the juridical
implications of the nuclear weapon-free zone regimes. Commentators, as well
as the International Court of Justice, have made reference to the notion that
the law with respect to nuclear weapons is essentially a form of lex specialis.92
It is possible to see that the concept of lex specialis reinforces the position of
certain commentators that the regime of nuclear weapons, as such, is a sui
generis regime. I suggest that a more careful appraisal of the nuclear weapon-
free zone regimes suggests, not so much an aspiration to a distinct regime, the
lex specialis, but, on the contrary, to the regimes' aspiration towards a gradual
policy of eradication. It is obvious that these regimes are not tied to any
specific component of nuclear weapons policy, but, in fact, the multiple free
zone regimes speak in broad, comprehensive terms. This seems to undermine
the expectation, in general, that the nuclear regime is an essentially treaty-
dominated form of lex specialis or that it is totally sui generis. The nature of
free zone regimes is geographically delimited, but is comprehensive in
seeking to prevent all nuclear weapons activity within the declared zones.
It may be useful in this regard to more carefully outline the African
nuclear weapon-free regime because, in many ways, Africa represents the
smaller states of the world that do not wish to have their security
compromised by the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the only
African. country that has had- nuclear weapons, South Africa, has itself made
the decision not to be a nuclear power. Let us, therefore, outline the key
characteristics of the African regime and their larger implications.
91. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, supra note 87, art. 1,
para. 2.
92. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Political Consequences of the General Assembly
Advisory Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE WORLD COURT, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 471, 483
(Laurence Bosson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., forthcoming 1999) (describing the legal status
of nuclear weapons as sui generis).
93. See Albright, supra note 86, at 37 (describing South Africa's accession to the
nonproliferation regime).
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The Organization for African Unity (OAU) has long recognized the need
for a treaty that would keep Africa out of the nuclear weapons arms race.94 On
April 11, 1996, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of
Pelindaba) was opened for signature.95 Egypt, which had been a leader in
calling for the renunciation of nuclear military choice, signed the treaty on the
first day of its initiation.96 The treaty, in general, carries within it the
principles of nonproliferation as well as major power guarantees.97 In fact,
major powers, such as the United States, a charter member of the nuclear club,
supported in principle the denuclearization of Africa as far back as 1965.98
The United States admits to playing an active role in the final draft of the
treaty, including relevant protocols.
99
The treaty prohibits any research, development, manufacture,
stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control, or stationing of nuclear
explosive devices on the territory of the parties to the treaty. 100 The treaty also
prohibits dumping of radioactive wastes in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone by parties to the treaty.10' Additionally, the treaty prohibits attacks
against nuclear installations by parties to the treaty. 102 The treaty requires
installations to maintain the highest standards of care for the physical
protection of nuclear materials, equipment, and related facilities that operate
for peaceful purposes.103 Peaceful nuclear activities must fully comply with
the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. 1°4 The treaty envisions a
verification process that includes the creation of an African Commission on
Nuclear Energy. 05 Parties to the treaty retain the competence to determine
whether nuclear-powered crafts may be permitted to visit their airports and
harbors. 0 6  The treaty contains three protocols that connect treaty
94. See Final Text of a Treaty on an Afican Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, supra note 90,
Foreword by the Secretary-General.
95. See G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., 51st Sess., U.N. Doe. AI51I566IAdd. 19
(1997).
96. See African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 698 (1995) (reprinting the text
of the Treaty of Pelindaba with dates of signing). Egypt signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty when it was opened for signature at Cairo on April 11, 1996. See id.
97. See Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, supra note 90,
Annex.
98. See Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, G.A. Res. 47/76,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 82, U.N. Doc. A147/49 (1992); U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1996 Annual Report, ch. I (visited Mar. 31, 1998)
<http:lwww.ada.gov/reports/chapl.htm>.
99. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, supra note 98.
100. See Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, supra note 90,
Annex, arts. 3, 4.
101. Seeid. art. 7.
102. See id. art. 1l.
103. See id. art. 10.
104. See id. arts. 6, 8.
105. See id. art. 12.
106. See id. art. 1, para. c.
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responsibilities with members of the nuclear club (the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and China). 107
As discussed above, the nuclear-free zones regime is not unique to
Africa. These expressions of international lawmaking through the treaty
process are complemented by expressions of law and policy by other major
institutions of international decision-making (the Security Council, the
General Assembly, and the ICJ). Notwithstanding the existence of this regime,
however, considerable controversy remains as to what precisely the status of
nuclear weapons is in general international law.108 It is apparent that, despite
the African nuclear-free zone regime, the continent will not be immune from
the effects of a nuclear catastrophe caused by the intentional or accidental
deployment and use of nuclear weapons in any other part of the world. Thus,
nuclear-free zones, to be effective, must extend the reach of their agreements.
I suggest that Africa's nuclear weapon-free zone, and others like it, may
have a direct influence on the emerging rules, principles, and policies that
general international law may prescribe for the control, regulation, and
abolition of all nuclear weapons systems. Africa shares a strategic interest
with the rest of mankind-the fundamental U.N. promise that we must turn
"swords into plowshares" in order to secure peace and security on a universal
basis.
The regime of nuclear-free zones on the planet is important from a
technical point of view. These regimes do not fit easily into the category of lex
specialis because, in part, they are not specialized to particular aspects of
testing and/or distribution. In fact, within geographically delimited zones they
aspire to be completely comprehensive. They thus seek to make a more
general contribution that goes beyond control and regulation to clear
elimination. A second important aspect of the regimes is that their
geographical reach and demographic composition essentially means that a
107. See id. art. 4, Protocols I-ilI. Protocol I invites these powers to neither threaten to use nor
use nuclear explosive devices against a treaty party. Protocol Il invites members of the club to not test,
assist, or encourage testing of nuclear devices within the zone. Protocol l deals with states exercising
control over dependent territories in Africa and deals only with France and Spain. The treaty comes into
force when the 28th country ratifies it, and the Protocols come into force when Protocol signatories
deposit the instruments of ratification after the treaty comes into force.
108. See Bonnie Jenkins & Theodore M. Hirsch, Arms Control and Development, 31 INT'L
LAw. 561 (1997) (analyzing how various treaties and agreements treat nuclear weapons); Prudence
Taylor, Testing Times for the World Court: Judicial Process and the 1995 French Nuclear Tests Case, 8
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 199 (1997) (exploring concepts expressed by the dissent's opinion in
the Nuclear Tests Case); see also CARL H. BUILDER & MORLIE H. GRAUBARD, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION (1982)
(analyzing the debate on the utility of deterrence); Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critique of United States
Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 35 (1983) (discussing the theories and policies fueling
the development, deployment, and possible use of nuclear weapons); Peter A. Ragone, The Applicability
of Military Necessity in the Nuclear Age, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 701 (1984) (discussing the
concept of military necessity as a defense to sanction in the law of war, and arguing that it is not
unlimited in its application in the nuclear age). On the American deterrence policy, see THE AMERICAN
ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POLICIES FROM THE DISCOVERY OF FISSION TO THE
PRESENT 210-38 (Robert C. Williams & Philip L. Cantelon eds., 2d ed. 1991) (presenting articles and
official statements on deterrence); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, DETERRENCE IN THE 1980s: PART I (1982)
(chronicling deterrence strategies since 1950); and Guy OAKES, THE IMAGINARY WAR: CIVIL DEFENSE
AND AMERICAN COLD WAR CULTURE (1994).
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vast physical part of the planet is meant to be nuclear weapon-free in the here
and now, and this territorial construct includes a very substantial part of the
human population. A third important fact concerning the nuclear weapon-free
zones is that they represent the small countries of the planet expressing
themselves in a plan of action of concrete global salience. It is therefore
crucial that any appraisal of the lex specialis, treaty-based regime relating to
the control and regulation of nuclear weapons, must be legally assessed
against the existence of the nuclear weapon-free zone regimes.
IV. LExSPECLALIS: THE TREATY-BASED REGIME
In various arenas of international decision-making, we have seen the
practice of severely limiting nuclear tests, especially those in the atmosphere.
Strenuous efforts were and continue to be made to give efficacy to the
recently renewed Non-Proliferation Treaty.109 Because the superpowers'
nuclear arsenals had indeed been subject to overproduction and over-
deployment, major agreements were made to reduce the number of actually
deployed weapons in the world.110 Although it has the raw materials and
technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, South Africa has set the
example for Africa: It neither wants nuclear weapons, nor does it want to
make or deploy them.1" It is strongly in favor of a vigorous regime of
nonproliferation. In effect, the nation's policy affirms other African voices
that urge that the continent should be a nuclear weapons-free zone in form and
fact. The South African example is an important precedent for small states
that may harbor the desire to become nuclear powers and also sets a good
example for universalizing the nonproliferation regime.
The emergent regimes aiming to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals with
a long-term goal of their complete elimination have also generated a more
acute consensus about another danger. How is the international community
going to dispose safely of the vast amount of contaminated nuclear waste?
109. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 52. On May 11, 1995,
the Non-Proliferation Treaty was extended. See Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part 1), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 959
(1995),
110. The process of agreements on a bilateral basis involving the United States and the Soviet
Union began with the ABM process. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.SR, 23 U.S.T. 3437 [hereinafter Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty].
111. South Africa is the only signatory country in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons that voluntarily discontinued its nuclear capability before signing the agreement. See Waldo
Stumpf, South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement, ARMs
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 3; see also Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone, supra note 90, Annex; FROM DEFENCE TO DEVELOPMENT: REDIRECTING MiLITARY
REsOURCEs IN SouTH AFRICA (Jacklyn Cock & Penny Mckenzie eds., 1998) (arguing for
demilitarization as a means of furthering South Africa's democratic transition); Albright, supra note 86,
at 46-47 (analyzing reasons why South Africa developed a nuclear arsenal but then ordered its
destruction, and detailing the historical turning points in the South African nuclear program).
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Lingering fears exist that policymakers may seek to use weak, vulnerable
Third World nations in Africa and elsewhere as the most "rational dumping
ground."',12
These trends have taken place in light of the ICJ's unwillingness to
declare openly that Australia's claim to be free from the contaminant effects
of French nuclear testing was supported by a violation of international law.
11 3
It is vital that we now carefully characterize the regime's nature relating to the
control and regulation of nuclear weapons as it has emerged from the welter
of global, regional, and bilateral undertakings to determine exactly what this
regime is and in what direction it is headed.
A. The Conceptual Basis of the Current Regime
By the 1960s, the nuclear arms race had simply gotten out of hand.
Nuclear arsenals in the possession of the superpowers had the capacity to
destroy life on Earth many times over. Many recognized nuclear weapons to
be the primary threat to international peace and security, and in a larger sense,
to eco-social survival. The emerging treaty-based regimes sought to prevent
nuclear weapons proliferation, 1 4 suspend testing,11 5 reduce the stockpiles of
weapons,116 and increase systems for verification of the reduction in
stockpiles.' 17 Nuclear club members became increasingly ardent supporters of
these prescriptions.118
In 1995, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a cornerstone of global policy,
was indefinitely renewed." 9  The agreement's framework included
declarations by the Security Council's permanent members, and, as Professor
Reisman has written, established the following principles:
(1) that in the future, individual states holding nuclear weapons should do so
not by virtue of inherent sovereignty, but under the "authority of the
international community;"'
120
(2) that the international community's competence is recognized for
determining the conditions under which nuclear weapons are held;
121
112. The question of the safe management and storage of radioactive wastes has been an
increasingly international problem as indicated in the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1436
(1997).
113. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 287 (Dec. 20).
114. See, e.g., South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, supra note 89, art. 3 (renouncing the
possession of nuclear explosive devices).
115. See, e.g., id. art. 6 (banning testing)
116. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (renouncing possession of nuclear explosive devices).
117. See, e.g., id. arts. 8-10 (seeking to increase systems of verification to reduce stockpiles).
118. See Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 109.
119. Seeid.
120. Reisman, supra note 92, at 480.
121. See id.
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(3) that the Security Council's permanent members are, in effect, "licensed"
by the international community as lawful holders of nuclear weapons;
122
and
(4) the corollary principle that other members of the international
community cannot now lawfully acquire such weapons.
123
B. The Legal Status of Nuclear "Licensees"
The regime of nonproliferation has serious implications for principles of
sovereignty and national security under which states would normally justify
the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. There are two views of
the legal implications of this regime. One holds that under this regime, the
price of major powers' keeping their weapons is that they hold them as
"licensees" for the international community as a whole.124 Sovereignty is
subordinated to the principle of international obligation. This seems, on the
surface, to be almost a revolution in international law doctrine. But there is a
second, more skeptical, construction that rejects the notion that the treaty
limits state sovereignty any more than the letter of the agreement.
Professor W. Michael Reisman endorses the first reading, suggesting
that there may be an implied or constructive obligation analogous to that of a
"licensee" on- the part of those members who hold nuclear stockpiles, but
agree to discourage or not to commit acts of nuclear proliferation. 125 1 suggest
that this is a troublesome construction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A
domestic law meaning of the term "licensee" might under Hohfeldian analysis
mean that the nuclear powers have a "privilege," the corollary of which is that
they have "no right."126 This seems to be an implausible meaning and simply
not in accord with the plain meaning of the treaty-based regime. On the other
hand, the term "licensee" could derive a meaning from the term "license."
Here the term is broader than the term "liberty" in the sense that in moral
discourse the ordinary meaning given to "liberty" is that it does not include
license, a concept which implies the abuse of liberty. In short, this gloss on the
term "licensee," as analogized to the nuclear weapons regime, clearly is not
designed to give the club of nuclear weapons holders a license to do as they
see fit.
The above view is not an implausible construction, but its
justification-if one can be implied-is to suggest a relatively strong Lotus
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 481; cf. Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 240 N.W. 2d 363, 366 (Wis.
1976) (defining a licensee as a "person who has a privilege to enter upon land arising from the
permission or consent, express or implied, of the possessor of land but who goes on the land for his own
purpose rather than for any purpose or interest of the possessor").
125. See Reisman, supra note 92, at 481-82 (describing nuclear signatories as licensees under
the nonproliferation regime).
126. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 38-39 (1964).
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basis in theory 127 for the NPT nuclear club members, and a strong treaty
obligation for all others (a sort of non-Lotus theory). It is possible that what
inspires this distinction is an analogy to the structure and functions of the
Security Council permanent members, who have enhanced powers of
sovereignty. Each can exercise a veto over matters within the jurisdiction of
the Security Council. The built-in veto is, of course, inconsistent with a literal
concept of the legal equality of states. 12 However, there is a universal,
community-wide acceptance of the concept of permanent members holding a
special standing in matters of international peace and security. The veto is a
necessary component of the competence of permanent members. However, we
must appreciate that the licensee construction comes in the context of a regime
operating in a less institutionalized context than the Security Council.
Moreover, it comes without the transparency, checks, balances, and structure
of deliberations of the Council. If this is the implicit assumption of Professor
Reisman's "licensee" construct, then the use of this legal analogy is freighted
with too much ambiguity and discretion.
A further concern about the licensee analogy is that it may not be
consistent with the pragmatic purpose of the NPT regime. This principle seeks
to freeze the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and promote
disarmament, while diminishing the risks of the threat, use, or accidental use
of nuclear weapons. The NPT's prime justification is that it is a vital practical
step toward the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. Viewed in this light,
the idea that nuclear weapons states hold their weapons as licensees may run
into the real danger of freezing the monopoly over the possession of these
weapons in the hands of a few powerful states. If this position becomes widely
perceived, it could undermine the practical objectives of the NPT regime.
One might also read into the NPT the perspective that the legal status of
the nuclear powers is not one analogous to a licensee (whatever this latter
term means). Rather, it is one of tenuous legality, obliging them to change in
light of the normative guidance proffered by the ICJ and the more generally
held expectation that complete abolition is a licit and urgent objective. In
short, we should avoid the paternalism implicit in the "licensee" model.
Rather, we should accept an uncomfortable compromise (a far from ideal
one), but one sustained by the realism and gravity of the problem inherent in
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in an unstable "global war system.'
29
127. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). The Lotus case
established the principle that restrictions upon the sovereignty of states cannot be presumed. This means
states have the competence under this theory of sovereignty to advance their interests as they see fit in
the absence of a specific rule of international law limiting the exercise of sovereign competence. A
strong Lotus theory essentially means that the principle of sovereignty is given great weight at the
expense of a presumed obligation to limit the sovereignty of the state. A very strong Lotus theory would
of course be comparable with a considerably expanded conception of self-defense under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. Thus, claims to nuclear arsenals based on a strong Lotus theory would in effect expand
the conception of what is justifiable security preparedness under international law.
128. See BARDO FASSBENDER, U.N. SEcuRrrY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 287-95 (1998) (discussing the tension between the veto and the equality
principle of the U.N. Charter).
129. This term is taken from an earlier Reisman article. See Reisman, supra note 30, at 7.
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Reisman's licensee concept seems to opt for "stability," which in this sense
means that those who have weapons may keep and, within limits, develop
them. Those who don't have them, won't have them. Pressing the analogy of a
nuclear juridical "licensee" may thus be conceptually flawed and may
misdirect expectations from the goal of complete eradication.
An alternative principle implicit in the NPT regime, and, in my view, the
more normatively satisfying one, is that the NPT must be seen as a pragmatic
part of an expedient, broader effort to change the nuclear era to a non-nuclear
era. It must, therefore, be seen not only as the cornerstone of a sui generis
regime, but as part of a general pattern of juridical expectations including
expectations about change. The recent ICJ opinion in the Nuclear Weapons
case 130 helps clarify the legal issue. At the heart of that opinion, the ICJ
appears to marry pragmatism (perhaps a soft Lotus theory)13 as it relates to
the narrower issues of survival, sovereignty, and self-defense, not to a legal
status quo, but to a vista of juridically guided legal change in the practice of
international relations. The hard law relating to the nuclear weapons issue
should not be seen as a reified artifact. The law as it is must purposefully
weave into and guide the law that is imminent. That is to say, the law that "is"
is not severed from shaping the law that is about to "be." In short, the court's
analysis sought to consolidate the good that had been accomplished regarding
the control and regulation of nuclear weapons with a commitment to the
normative guidance of legal change toward a regime of complete abolition
and universal proscription. Mediating between what is and what ought to be-
which, as we shall observe, the court has done-presents a more promising
construction of the promise and obligations in the NPT regime than Professor
Reisman's inadvertent homage to the politics of effective power.
Evidence as to the actual behavior of nuclear weapons states puts
Professor Reisman's formula into question. Efforts to develop smaller,
cleaner, more advanced nuclear weapons continue to be on the agenda of
some of the major powers. The recent report of the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) adds credence to the concern about an expeditious evolution
to abolition or more plausibly to the licensee-trustee development of new
generations of weapons of mass destruction. 132 The NRDC report, relying
upon documents retrieved under the Freedom of Information Act, reveals that
130. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
131. A soft Lotus theory is essentially a position that subordinates the doctrine of the Lotus case
or ameliorates it in order to enhance the concept of international obligation. In this context, it essentially
means that concepts like survival, sovereignty, and self-defense must be strictly and narrowly construed
so as to enhance the concept of international concern generated by the threat of and/or use of nuclear
weapons.
132. See CHRISTOPHER E. PAMNE & MATHEW G. MCKINZIE, END RUN: THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT'S PLAN FOR DESIGNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SIMULATING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (1997); see also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 105-28, available at 1996 WL
924706 (increasing international restrictions by prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons).
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the U.S. Government's "stockpile" stewardship and management plan (SSMP)
would circumvent the primary objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty.133 According to the report, there is evidence of a "deliberate and
systematic program by a treaty party to render the CTBT's constraints less
effective" in such a way that "would over time overcome" these
constraints." 134 According to this report, the United States is planning to
implement the SSMP as follows:
significantly expand its base of nuclear weapons knowledge by building extensive above-
ground experimental (AGEX) facilities for nuclear weapons physics and conducting
underground high-explosive experiments with plutonium and other nuclear materials at
the Nevada Test Site;
develop within the coming decade comprehensive three-dimensional, computer
simulations of nuclear weapons performance--a "virtual testing" capability;
develop and integrate into existing weapons improved components, such as new radars,
detonators, neutron generators, and boost-gas transfer systems;
rebuild and certify the performance of weapons with modified nuclear (plutonium "pit"
and uranium "secondary") components;
modify and repackage existing nuclear weapons.., and conduct flight-tests to certify
their ability to provide an improved military capability by withstanding the stresses of a
new stockpile-to-target sequence (STS), such as high speed earth penetration to destroy
hardened underground targets with reduced collateral damage;
design, simulate, and flight-test weapon prototypes, and certify both the nuclear and
stockpile-to-target performance of new weapon designs as possible replacements for
existing stockpile weapons.
13 5
Although the SSMP seems to compromise the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, in a larger sense it compromises Professor Reisman's "licensee"
construct as well. The revelations from the Natural Resources Defense
Council document do not inspire faith in state conduct as licensee, trustee,
mandatory, paterfamilias, or any of the other analogies drawn from the
perspective of comparative private law of the global community.
The licensee theory also suffers in light of the exposures of the scandal
involving the transmittal of nuclear weapons data to China.136 This raises three
key concerns. First, the enhanced scope of developing nuclear arsenals,
notwithstanding the treaty-based regime, seems to be an ongoing reality.
Second, the business of espionage represents a critical threat to the formal
regime of nonproliferation in general. Third, legislative efforts to deploy,
when technically feasible, a new missile defense system would appear to have
the effect of unilaterally abrogating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
133. According to its Preamble, the CTBT's objective is "to contribute effectively to the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear
disarmament, and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security." Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note-132, pmbl.
134. PAINE & MCKINzIE, supra note 132, at 2.
135. PAINE & McKINzIE, supra note 132, at 3.
136. See James Risen, U.S. Fires Researcher It Suspects of Giving A-Bomb Data to China,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,1999, at Al.
with Russia. 137 This provides for a further level of skepticism regarding
Professor Reisman's "moderate" construct of the nuclear weapons regime.
However, these above reservations do not diminish the conceptual
clarity of a hard law reading of the international regime. Under such a scheme,
the nuclear powers commit themselves:
(1) not to use nuclear weapons against states that are non-nuclear powers;
(2) to assist a non-nuclear state threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons;
and
(3) to work toward strategies for reducing nuclear stockpiles with a view to
total nuclear disarmament.
Presumably, the state of total nuclear disarmament could mean the outlawing
per se of nuclear weapons. This, at least, seems to be the understanding of
treaty-based commitment reasonably construed.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE OUTLAWING OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
On May 14, 1993, the World Health Organization (WHO) requested an
advisory opinion from the ICJ. The legal question presented was the
following: "In view of health and environmental effects, would the use of
nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its
obligations under international law, including the WHO Constitution?"138 The
WHO request was followed on December 23, 1994, by the request of the U.N.
General Assembly for an advisory opinion as follows: "Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"
1 39
On July 8, 1996, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion.
140
The court's opinion canvasses a wide range of areas of international law
directly or indirectly relevant to the problem. While concern exists in some
quarters that the court has gone too far, or that the court has not gone far
137. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, supra note 110; Protocol to the ABM Treaty, July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645. See Joseph Galloway et al., Seeking a Silver Bullet Once Again, an
Expensive Quest for a Missile-defense Shield, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 30; Paul
Leavitt & Susan Page, Anti-missile Shield System Fails for 6th Consecutive Time, USA TODAY, Mar. 30,
1999, at 13A ('The Pentagon suffered another setback Monday in efforts to develop an anti-missile
system to protect troops and bases against more sophisticated ballistic missiles being stockpiled by
hostile forces."); Support Gathers Steam for National Missile Defense, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 22, 1999, at 29 ("If approved by Congress as a whole, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999
would codify as U.S. policy a commitment to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective
NMD system.").
138. Weiss et al., supra note 8, at 724.
139. Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A149/49 (1995).
140. See Legality of the Threat orUse ofNuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226 (July 8).
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enough, or that there is uncertainty as to exactly where the court has gone, I
submit that taken as a whole, the judgment does a great deal to strengthen the
prescriptive force of international law and to consolidate expectations clearly
discernible about the scope and character of legal regulation. The opinion
provides a framework for an informed discourse with an important role for
international lawyers in the center of this global conversation. Perhaps the
conversation inaugurated is supported by factors that define the "hard law" of
nuclear weapons and at the same time seeks to more firmly establish a "soft
law" of complete eradication in the future. These are not assumptions shared
by all members of the court, especially the vice president, Judge
Weeramantry.
141
The court's opinion examines the relationships between nuclear
weapons and humanitarian law, the law of the environment, and the law
relating to the permissible use of coercion in international law. The opinion
also covers the interpretation of treaty obligations and the expectations
generated by variously situated commitments to determine whether the
requisite opiniojuris is there to ground obligations in customary international
law. Other opinions, including those in partial dissent, add significantly to the
importance of law and of international lawyers in this difficult, but vitally
important, arena.
It may be of value to start this appraisal of the court's opinion with the
assessment of a major critic, Professor Richard Falk. Professor Falk holds that
the advisory opinion finds the "elusive middle ground between geopolitical
deference and defiance, as well as repudiating the moral consensus of
international society and translating this moral consensus into a political
mandate." 1
42
What exactly does Falk mean by the term "elusive middle ground"? This
"middle ground" is important, as it is the ground that underscores the area of
distinct juridical concern and competence. How much "flexibility" is there in
this juridical continuum in which the "elusive" middle defines the competence
of the highest judicial tribunal-the U.N. system? What kind of discourse,
standards, and principled criteria have to be invoked to secure this prudential
exercise of judicial power? One way to make sense of the court's decision is
to accept the idea that the geopolitical middle ground is indeed juridically
elusive and to refocus the lens of the critical observer: perhaps we can see in
the holdings of the judges a heuristic continuum from complete abolition at
141. See id. at 433 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). Judge Weeramantry wrote the most widely
cited dissenting opinion. He agrees with the court's discussion on the limitation of nuclear weapons in
terms of the U.N. Charter and the prohibition of methods of warfare resulting in environmental damage.
However, Judge Weeramantry has several strong critiques of the majority opinion. The judge argues that
the court's opinion should have held "directly and categorically that the use or threat of use of the
weapon is unlawful in all circumstances without exception," id., and he further reasons that the U.N.
Charter, humanitarian law, the severe nature and effects of nuclear weapons, and the international
community's attitude towards nuclear weapons, all point to a more forceful and vigorous call by the
court for the complete prohibition of the use ofnuclear weapons. See id. at 434.
142. Richard Falk, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of
Global Civil Society, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333, 349 (1997) (citations to ICJ cases
omitted).
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one end to the possibility of permissive use at the other. Where exactly the
court lies on that continuum requires sharper focus. In my view, the "extreme
circumstances" exception for self-defense 43-and construction of Article VI
of the NPT mandating the pursuit of good faith negotiations to achieve
"effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament '144-move us quite far from the
"elusive" middle. The court seems implicitly sensitive to the fact that there is
widespread, articulate support for outright abolition in state and non-state
actors alike, and that the struggle will impact the legal change implied by the
obligation to negotiate. The court has, in fact, opened the door to further
agitation, interest articulation, and further international pressures to finally
proscribe nuclear weapons without exception. Moreover, the narrow exception
seems hardly practical as a strategic defense perspective, unless the term
"survival" does not actually mean "survival," as used by the court. The court
says:
The legal import of the obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the
obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the
pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith. 4 5
The court's holdings have in fact provided a considerable degree of
judicial clarity about the role of law in seeking to outlaw the threat and/or use
of nuclear weapons. There is of course ambiguity in parts of what the court
has actually prescribed. For example, the court's unwillingness, as a matter of
hard law, to declare categorically the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons
unlawful in limited self-defense circumstances is not without ambiguity.
Indeed, this exception is itself qualified by the acknowledgment that there is a
more general continuing obligation for all states in the area of disarmament
and the general community expectation to negotiate an end to the nuclear
weapons' threat to the Earth-space community.
Critics of the opinion, like Judge Weeramantry, would have required a
clear and unambiguous juridical statement from the court that nuclear
weapons are incompatible with international law in the here and now. Judge
Weeramantry, like the other judges on the court, must grapple with a basic
principle of international adjudication that in general allocates certain matters
to the domestic jurisdiction of a state, and other matters to the purview of
legitimate international concern. In the international context, matters of
international concern are vested with both political and legal importance. This
is especially true in matters relating to international peace, security, and
claims to self-defense. The Nicaragua case146 remains highly controversial
143. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 LCJ. at 263,266.
144. Id. at 264.
145. Id.
146. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
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because the Cold War-inspired interventions in Nicaragua's internal affairs by
the United States were deemed to be matters within the purview of
international jurisdictional concern, and within the competence of the key
juridical arm of the international legal system, the ICJ.
In the South West Africa decision, 147 the ICJ declined to decide the
international legal status of the League of Nations mandate as it applied to
South West Africa (now Namibia) and South Africa's administration of the
"territory" on the grounds that the complaining parties had not established
their legal standing to prosecute the claim. Implicit in the ruling, however,
was the concern that the issue was really "political" and more appropriately
resolved in the political branches of the international constitutional system,
namely, the U.N. General Assembly. It is worthy of note that the General
Assembly had done just that. They in effect accepted "jurisdiction" over the
mandate controversy, and by decision, terminated it.148 This decision was
supported, in effect, by the U.N. Security Council. 149 However, having made
the "political" choice of terminating South Africa's status as the mandatory
power over South West Africa, the General Assembly requested an advisory
opinion from the ICJ as to the legal consequences of its action. The role of the
court here was not primary; it considered a political matter, vested with clear
and present threats to international peace and security. The court responded to
the request, which gave it powerful juridical imprimatur over a "security"
matter.
The foundational problem of the allocation of competence regarding the
threat and/or use of nuclear weapons involves two lines of juridical inquiry.
The first line is the technical question of who might claim the competence to
request an advisory opinion. Assuming the requesting parties have the legal
right to present such a request, there is still a technical and prudential issue
about the competence of the WHO, the General Assembly, and the court. As a
prudential matter, there are some advantages in the court rendering an
"advisory" opinion rather than one in the form of contentious proceedings. For
one thing, the requesting parties (the WHO and the General Assembly) are
institutional actors that represent a broad cross section of international public
opinion. The perspectives represented are not solely confined to those who
already monopolize nuclear technologies. Additionally, the procedural
capability of states to join in the proceedings in written memorials and oral
representations permits a broad spectrum of articulate interests to be
expressed.
The second line of inquiry must focus on how the court itself defines its
competence to issue an advisory opinion and the standards and criteria it uses
to define that competence. Indeed, the court's use of the advisory opinion
1 (June 27).
147. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)
(referring to General Assembly Resolution 2145 XXI).
148. See id. at 50-51.
149. See id. at 51-54.
mechanism has enormously sharpened and enriched the discourse about the
legal status of nuclear weapons. In short, the mechanism and process of an
advisory opinion broadens the level of interest-participation in a crucial global
debate, and underscores the importance of legal discourse and a fortiori of
international law in seeking to clarify and ultimately to secure the common
interests of the entire Earth-space community. How the juridical perspective
plays itself out in the actual decisions of the ICJ is a subtle but critical matter
as the substantive holdings of the court indicate.
A. Participation in the Discourse: The WHO, the General Assembly, the
ICJ, and Civil Society
The request for an advisory opinion came from the World Health
Organization and the General Assembly of the United Nations.150 These are
not sovereign states, although U.N. membership is restricted to sovereign
states. As an institutional matter, these requests emerge from non-state
institutional actors. The WHO is a specialized agency of the United Nations
concerned with world health matters.151 The General Assembly is a political
body with narrow lawmaking capacity, but with broad powers of "inquiry"
and the power to make recommendations on matters dealing with the U.N.
Charter's goals and purposes. Why would a body specialized in health care
matters be interested in a legal opinion about a matter seemingly charged with
geopolitical implications and strong claims to exclusive sovereign competence
by some states? Without canvassing the voting records of health care
organizations about the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons, we may assume
that the medical profession (operating through the WHO) was insisting that its
concerns and fears be adequately voiced through the appropriate juridical and
political channels.
150. Article 96(2) of the U.N. Charter allows specialized agencies of the U.N. to request
advisory opinions within the scope of their activities, as authorized by the General Assembly. See U.N.
CHARTER, art. 96, para. 2. The General Assembly provided blanket authorization to the WHO covering
"legal questions arising within the scope of its competence." G.A. Res. 124(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/124 (1947). Article 96(1) of the Charter allows both the General Assembly and the
Security Council to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ "on any legal question." U.N. CHARTER art.
96, para. 1.
151. The question of whether the WHO was competent to present questions on the health and
environmental aspects of the use of nuclear weapons, and, in particular, whether from this perspective a
state would be in breach of its international legal obligations by neglecting obligations under the
constitution of the WHO, was carefully dealt with by the ICJ. Essentially, the court held that the WHO
request did not relate to the effects of nuclear weapons on health, but to the lawfulness of the use of
nuclear weapons from the perspective of their environmental and health-related consequences. See
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 LC.J. 226, 232-38 (July 8). This is a subtle, but
not necessarily compelling, distinction. It does, however, pose an important question of principle about
broadening the level of participation in the processes of international adjudication. -It can be said with
confidence that as a practical matter, the WHO request finally did generate an advisory opinion, even if
technically the court had held that the specific request was beyond the scope of the WHO constitution.
Sei id.
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The fact that the WHO sought an advisory opinion from the ICJ is
interesting. If the court accepted the WHO request on this issue, it would in
effect be bringing another important professional voice and a broader
discourse to the issue of nuclear weapons and world order matters. In short,
one might conceive of the role of the ICJ in such a case as bringing a
distinctively juridical perspective to the global discourse about the status of
nuclear weapons, world peace, security, and survival. The WHO request
would have had the effect of functionally broadening the discourse about
nuclear weapons by forcing the court to take into account the juridical nature
of health, well-being, and environmental concerns. The joinder of
environmental and health care concerns with their legal consequences would
also implicate the status of nuclear weapons and world order. Although the
court had ruled against the WHO's request on highly technical grounds, 15 2 it is
instructive to recognize, as I shall shortly suggest, that the forces behind the
WHO and the General Assembly were in part moved by anti-nuclear pressure
groups including professional groups who are influential constituent members
of global civil society.
The role of the modem international lawyer is also clearly affected by
the ICJ decision, since the ICJ opinion disposes in substantial measure of the
idea that a serious discourse about the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons is
a matter exclusively confined to sovereign states, members of the nuclear
club, or the political security specialists of sovereign states. What the court
has clearly done is to provide a framework through which the structures of
152. The opinion of the court in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case should be contrasted
with the dissent of Judge Weeramantry. See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 433
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting). According to Judge Weeramantry, WHO clearly has a legal interest in
presenting its request for an advisory opinion based on both a textual and a teleological construction of
the WHO Constitution. The reasoning is systematic and clear:
(1) The WHO has an interest in matters related to global health, even though these issues also
concern questions of peace and security.
(2) The WHO has an interest in environmental matters, even though they also concern questions of
peace and security.
(3) The fact that other organs in the U.N. system are expressly charged with responsibilities in the
area of peace and security does not preclude the WHO from concerning itself with matters of
peace and security to the extent that they affect global health and the global environment.
(4) There are compelling medical and environmental reasons which require the WHO to take an
interest in the matter on which it seeks an opinion.
(5) There are several constitutional provisions rendering the requested opinion relevant to the WHO.
(6) The impossibility of curative steps forces the WHO into the area of prevention.
(7) The WHO has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a
violation of state obligations in relation to health.
(8) The WHO has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a
violation of state obligations in relation to the environment.
(9) The WHO has a legitimate interest in knowing whether state obligations under its own
Constitution are violated by the use of nuclear weapons.
(10) There are state obligations under international law in regard to health which would be violated
by the use of nuclear weapons.
(11) There are state obligations under international law in regard to the environment which would be
violated by the use of nuclear weapons.
(12) There are state obligations under international law in regard to the WHO Constitution which
would be violated by the use of nuclear weapons.
See id.
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legal reasoning and legal justification might become an important part of the
discourse about the fate of nuclear weapons as we approach the millennium.
The General Assembly as indicated requested an advisory opinion on
December 15, 1994 on the issue of whether "the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstances [was] permitted under international law." 153 At
the heart of the request was the issue, as suggested earlier, of whether the rule
of law should be subordinated to the rule of sovereign political power. As
Professor Falk has indicated, the issue was "a geopolitically hot issue,
' 154
requiring juridical consideration in the face of strongly expressed concerns
that matters of state policy and politics, characteristic of important security
matters, not be subject even to advisory review.
Certainly, as one reviews the role of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in advancing the fundamental security concerns that nuclear weapons
pose, one may see an indicator of a widespread apprehension about the state
of nuclear weapons as we approach the millennium. Professor Falk has
insightfully drawn attention to the World Court Project, which was created to
focus on the problem of the legal abolition of the threat and/or use of nuclear
weapons. 155 The project has been sponsored by such NGOs as the
International Peace Bureau, the International Physicians for Social
Responsibility, and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear
Arms. These pressure groups directly influenced the WHO and the General
Assembly's request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice on the basic questions relating to the legality of nuclear weapons. The
doctrinal importance of this insight is that it undermines the classical
distinction that international law is essentially a public matter, and that the
private participation of civil society in its making and application must be
relegated to the margins of the international legal process. Of course, the
International Court of Justice does not entertain jurisdiction with respect to
individuals and private associations. However, its decision in the nuclear
weapons case could not have happened without NGOs and an aggressive civil
society playing active roles in the invocation of its jurisdiction through the
relevant institutions of the United Nations (WHO and the General Assembly).
However, not all that emerges from civil society is laudable. As
Professors Lifton and Markusen 57 have reminded us, leaders in the legal and
scientific communities as well as NGOs were not only deeply implicated in
the creation of a nuclear weapons culture, they were also deeply implicated in
the Nazi version of genocide. 158 In spite of this, the role of civil society was
153. G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 71, U.N. Doc. A149/49
(1995).
154. Falk, supra note 142, at 340.
155. See id. at 339-47.
156. See id. at 341-42.
157. See generally LIFTON & MARKUSEN, supra note 15 (describing the role of civil society in
both the Holocaust and the production of nuclear weapons).
158. See, e.g., id. at 98 ("You see what happened to me-what happened to the rest ofus, is we
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vitally important in bringing pressure that ultimately provided a basis for
reasoned, informed discourse about the threat and use of nuclear weapons in
international society. Implicit in the broader context of the nuclear weapons
advisory opinion is the important role of effective participation in the making
and application of international law. It is clear that there is a wider universe of
participants in this process than only sovereign states.
B. Specific Holdings of the ICJ and Institutional Competence
There are in essence six primary substantive issues to which the court
responds. Indeed, a short review of the key holdings of the court will
graphically underscore the deft subtlety of the court's response to the request
for an advisory opinion. First, regarding the issue of whether international law
authorizes the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the court holds that there is in
neither conventional nor customary international law a "specific
authorization" for the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 159 This of course sets
the stage for the court's more ambiguous holding that relates to self-defense
and national survival. It is obvious and uncontroversial that international law
in general does not specifically authorize states to use nuclear weapons or
develop them. The critical term here is "specific authorization." The second
holding in this context establishes the complementary prescriptive principle
that international law neither specifically nor comprehensivelyproscribes, in a
universal sense, the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 16  This too is
uncontroversial, but it does establish a kind of general legal gap that has to be
supplemented within the boundaries of prudent judicial intervention.
The third substantive holding ties in specifically to the Charter's Article
2(4) (stipulating that all members refrain from the threat or use of force
against any state) and Article 51 (allowing self-defense in the event of an
armed attack). These provisions relate to the prohibition of aggression and
self-defense. Here the court holds that a threat or use of nuclear weapons that
cannot meet the standards of Article 51 would be a violation of Article 2(4),
and hence would be unlawful. 161 A fourth substantive holding requires that the
issue presented in the request also be appraised against the evolution of treaty-
based law dealing with various aspects of nuclear arsenals as well as against
the principles of humanitarian law. 162 These four substantive holdings
started for a good reason, then you're working very hard to accomplish something, and it's pleasure, it's
excitement. And you just stop thinking, you know, you stop." (quoting Richard Feynman)). Liflon and
Markusen present a similar view from a critic of those scientists:
These guys take a lot of satisfaction in knowing they're going to be consulted over
whether civilization will be destroyed or not .... It's a hubris, or arrogance, which says,
"We are really bright guys and we can keep the country from doing ridiculous things."...
And they're totally unaware that they're just being used by some little, puddin'-headed
guy in the Pentagon.
Id. at 133 (quoting a critic of the elite group of scientists working on nuclear weapons).





establish an important juridical principle: that notwithstanding the political
nature of this "geopolitical hot potato," the problem is vested with critical
elements of international juridical concern and consideration falls within the
competency of judicial discourse.
The fifth major substantive holding makes a critical point about the
continuing relevance of the rules relating to the ius in bello, especially the
rules of humanitarian law. Here the court concludes that in general the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would "be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict."163 A second part of this holding, however, is
most vital. Here the court states:
in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal,
the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the
very survival of a State would be at stake.164
This could be seen as avoiding a core issue. Certainly it is possible to
impute such a characterization to the slim majority role in this issue. However,
the crucial interpretive word in this sentence is "and." This word supplies a
conjunctive rather than disjunctive meaning to the words "international law"
and "fact." Read conjunctively, the "and" suggests that the construction and
interpretation of international law is not a purely doctrinal exercise, but its
meaning, scope, and salience are often a function of context. This suggests
that the central legal issue involves the construction and interpretation of fact
and law. In this posture, the confirmation or modification of an international
legal norm represents the challenge of managing change in the adjudicatory
process of the ICJ, whether "molecular" or "molar." This point is important
because it defines the prudential scope of judicial versus administrative,
political, or executive competence. The deft gloss of this statement on the
scope of the court's reviewing competence lies in the fact that the court has
sought to exercise a degree of deference, which is subtly delimited. The
implications are that it cannot decide the issue now, but it is a matter that
could be juridically determined in the future, under the right juridical
circumstances. This might include accounting for changing expectations
regarding both treaty law and customary law, as well as making a clearer
delineation of crucial factual contingencies, viewed as an important
(expectation-creating) discourse. All of these factors might in the future move
the court to an outright declaration of illegality, consistent with major
expectations of the international community as a whole. In other words, this
part of the holding does not need to be categorically construed as non liquet.
In this I agree with Professor Bums H. Weston's characterization of the
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
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holding. 165 The language and context suggest a more subtle calculation of the
judicial role in this advisory opinion.
Professor Weston also believes that a conceptual typology of diverse
factual contingencies might have been useful to the court to avoid what he
sees as a nonresponse to the core issue. Weston's typology focuses on nuclear
uses such as tactical defense uses, and threats of first and second strike
strategic and defensive uses. 166 In my view the court is partially correct when
it states that it "will simply address the issues in all their aspects by applying
the legal rules relevant to the situation."'167 But it pragmatically declines to
conjure up hypothetical scenarios for various kinds of weapons. Weston
argues that the advisory opinion is "incapable of the detail and precision that
are characteristic of rulings in actual cases and controversies, as in contentious
proceedings."'168 While the search for reasonable justification with regard to
every scenario and every kind of nuclear weapon is indeed simply juridically
impossible, the aggregate estimation of the totality of the threat does permit a
prescription of an articulate legal standard of reasonableness in context,
including self-defense interests.
The construction we have given the fifth holding of the court seems to
dovetail into the sixth holding although the vote on the fifth issue was seven to
seven and the vote on the latter was unanimous. The sixth holding is that
"there exists an obligation [under Article VI of the 1968 NPT] to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control.'
169
The difference in the voting pattern should be more clearly understood. Three
dissenting judges (Weeramantry, Koroma, and Shahabuddeen) did not vote
with the majority in the fifth holding because they wanted a broader
declaration of illegality in all circumstances and did not feel the survival
exception was a warranted outcome. As Professor Weston has correctly
observed, the position of the court tilts in the direction of the unlawfulness of
the threat and use of nuclear weapons (functionally a ten to four vote).170 The
other perspectives are sufficiently disparate that, according to Weston, these
opinions in effect "lacked any real coherence" as dissenting voices.171 Taking
the "tilting" toward unlawfulness interpretation of issue five, the sixth
holding' 72 was, as indicated, unanimous, and yet it provides an important
point of pressure on the tilt toward illegality. According to the court, "[t]here
exists an obligation [under Article VI of the 1968 NPT] to pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in
165. See Bums H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: Ambiguity's Consensus, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 371 (1997) (arguing for a nuanced interpretation of the ambiguities
inherent in the court's opinion).
166. See id. at 389.
167. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.L at 237.
168. See Weston, supra note 165, at 390.
169. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.L at 267.
170. See Weston, supra note 165, at 383-84.
171. Id. at 383.
172. See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. at 267.
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all its aspects under strict and effective international control." 173 The principle
of good faith is one of the foundational principles of world order, and the
expectation of good faith is the legal foundation of that world order.
The obligation to cooperate to achieve the purposes of world
constitutional order is tied to the foreseeable processes of recognition
(membership in the Charter system) and even derecognition, for that matter.
At the heart of the international obligation to cooperate is, of course, the good
faith principle. In the Nuclear Tests Case, the court gave explicit recognition
to the good faith principle. 174 France had made a unilateral communication
through an authorized ministry that its testing program had come to an end.
The court accepted this statement as a fact of vital juridical salience. Because
France had in good faith indicated that its testing program was over, the object
and purpose of the case was removed. The case was accordingly dismissed.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations 175 gives a concrete form of expression
to this critical principle. The court thus has seized on the juridical character of
a continuing good faith obligation whose prime objectives are "nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects" and that this must be pursued under "strict and
effective international control.' 76 However, the obligation to cooperate means
coordinating activities at all levels of decision-making. If this is right, the
court has sought to mediate strategically befween licit juridical major purposes
and the tactical and strategic means of expeditiously realizing them. This is
neither hortatory nor an abdication of the judicial function. It is a wise course
of directed normative guidance with a strong juridical imprimatur.
The six substantive holdings tell us a great deal about the delicate
pragmatism the court has used in responding to the requests for an advisory
opinion. The court's prudential exercise of pursuing the legal discourse to
what it conceives to be the prudential limits of its judicial competence
inevitably involves compromise. However, the holdings also incorporate a
strong effort to shift a positivist paradigm of international law (law as it is) to
a paradigm suggesting that law is not static, but is evolving and must also
account for expectations of change. The court has effectively provided a
173. Id.
174. See Nuclear Tests Case (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 252 (Dec. 20). In that case, the court
found:
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations,
whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in
international co-operation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is
becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule or pact sunt servanda in the law of
treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international
obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance
of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the
obligation thus created be respected.
Id. at 268.
175. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
176. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 267.
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mediating standard which confirms the continuing relevance of international
legal tradition in light of new facts. The application of law to new facts, over
time, involves the critical structural constraint of practical, reasoned
elaboration. This view of the judicial role is consistent with the Grotian
tradition. To be sure, the soft Lotus position of the court on survival, self-
defense, extreme circumstances, and state sovereignty provides a weaker
Grotian predicate than the one proffered in Judge Weeramantry's dissent.177 It
is arguable that the gulf is not merely a middle ground but one premised upon
a pragmatic estimation of the molecular aspect of legal change. It is also
possible to construe the fifth holding as imposing such a high threshold of
justification on the issue of survival that what is left to the future is only a
theoretical loophole.
C. The Substantive Appraisal of the Advisory Opinion
The focus on the substantive holdings of the court provides us with a
sharp insight into the issue of the role and competence of the court from a
practical perspective. It is, however, also important to consider more carefully
the structure of the reasoning of the court on the various aspects of
international law and nuclear arsenals. In the structure of its reasoned
elaboration, we see the careful delineation of the boundaries of the role of the
court itself. In terms of the court's opinion, the most fundamental problem
posed by nuclear weapons relates to the protection of human life on the
planet: the right to life. The court quotes Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides the following: "Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."178 The meaning of this latter
phrase, it was held, had to be construed in light of the law of armed conflict.
This effectively means that Article 6's prescriptive force may be limited by
the prospect that a justification exists for the use of nuclear weapons under the
law of armed conflict.
A further concern about construing the right to life in this context is that
the term "arbitrary" in Article 6 could conceivably be given a more limited
meaning that derives from the law of armed conflict and that may posit a
"reasonable" grounds argument in which the permissibility of a nuclear
weapon depends upon its size. Since this is a pretty elastic operational
standard, it represents an important loophole in the analysis. Moreover, if
"reasonable" encompasses the meaning "arbitrary," the meaning of the right
to life in human rights law is weakened. This interpretation would indeed be
troubling from both a humanitarian and a human rights law point of view.
From a humanitarian point of view, it would be better to limit the
circumstances under which humanitarian law may be undermined by giving a
reasonably expansive gloss to the concept and meaning of the word
177. See id. at 433 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 239 (quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 52, art.
6, para. 1).
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"arbitrary." From a human rights point of view, it would be disastrous to
weaken the meaning of "arbitrary," particularly when we consider, as
Professor R.J. Rummel has indicated, that murder by government has reached
epidemic proportions (between 1900 and 1986, he noted 170,000,000 murders
by government). 179
The Genocide Convention is also given a cautious relevance.180 Its
applicability is triggered if and only if an intent exists to destroy, in whole or
in part, a specific group or subgroup, as specified in the definition of
genocide.'18 According to the court, "a determination would have to be made
as to applicability after having taken due account of the circumstances specific
to each case."182 This seriously weakens the prescriptive force of the Genocide
Convention in that it ignores the "prevention" element of the Convention'
s3
and focuses mainly on the punishment phase.184 One might suggest that the
court has given the Convention's prescriptive force a restrictive meaning.
In the court's canvass of the context of possible environmental
consequences relating to the use of nuclear weapons, the court found that the
prescriptions and policies relating to environmental protection also had to
account for the right of self-defense, as well as the "necessary" and
"proportionate" limits of permissible coercion. 185 The court determined that
"existing international law relating to the protection.., of the environment
[did] not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons." 18 6 The court did,
however, point out that existing international law indicates "important
environmental factors [to be] taken into account in a context of. . . the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict." 187 The court
concluded that the law and policy relating to the integrity and viability of the
Earth-space ecosystem is only of indirect relevance to the question of the
lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.18 8 The idea of an
ecosystem made uninhabitable to man and possibly all other major life forms
179. See R.J. RUMvMEL, DEATH BYGOVERNMENT9 (1994). Rummel writes:
In total, during the first eighty-eight years of this century, almost 170 million men,
women, and children have bein shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen,
crushed, or worked to death, buried alive, drowned, hung, bombed, or killed in any other
of the myriad ways governments have inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens and
foreigners. The dead could conceivably be nearly 360 million people. It is as though our
species has been devastated by a modem Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of
Power, not germs.
Id.
180. See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 240.
181. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 11, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
182. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.L at 241.
183. See Genocide Convention, supra note 181, art. I (providing that the contracting parties
"undertake to prevent and to punish" genocide).
184. See id. arts. III-IV.
185. See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 242.
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might incite a more generous construction of the rules of international
environmental law-and not simply in light of the ius in bello.
This aspect of the court's opinion is important because of its canvass of
important sources of law and their appropriate interrelations. The right to a
viable ecosystem, the right to life, and the right to suppress and punish
genocide are relevant factors in determining what is lawful in the nuclear
context. International law and contemporary moral order may hold
expectations that expand these boundaries more generously than the ICJ's
interpretive gloss. Since these prescriptions are of only indirect relevance to
the question for which an advisory opinion was sought, the next important
phase of the opinion addresses the state of the law most directly relevant to the
issue.
In this regard, the court finds what one might call the "hard law" relating
to the problem. The hard law is what governs the use of armed force,
enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Other directly applicable law includes the rules
of the wider body of international law applicable to armed conflict and that
which regulates the conduct of hostilities. The court also identifies the hard
law treaty regime relating to nuclear weapons. In this context, the court notes
the unique character of nuclear weapons and their "potential to destroy all
civilization and the entire ecosystem." 189 The court notes that Article 2(4)
(prohibition of aggression) and Article 51 (self-defense) of the Charter do not
refer to any specific weapons or weapon systems. 9 The court further notes
that Article 42, which authorizes the Security Council to use military force,
similarly is silent on the question of weapons and weapon systems.' 9' The
court thus concluded that the Charter does not explicitly proscribe or sanction
the use of any specific weapon, "including nuclear weapons." 192 This analysis
may be contrasted with Judge Weeramantry's construction of the principal
purposes of the Charter as indicated, inter alia, in the Preamble itself.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 244.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 433 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). The Preamble states:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small, and... to practice tolerance and live together
in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain
international peace and security ... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish
these aims.
U.N. CHARTER pmbl. Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that the purposes of the United Nations
include:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace ....
Id. art. 1, para. 1. Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter provides that a further purpose is "[to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
ofpeoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Id. art. 1, para. 2.
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The court finds the basis for the possible licit use of nuclear weapons in
Article 51, although that article under both customary and contemporary
practice is subject to the general constraints in international law concerning
the use of force (namely, the principles of necessity, proportionality, as well
as the principles of humanitarianism). What then are the circumstances under
which a state may have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons under Article
51?
The court's reasoning is not absolutely clear. The reasoning seems to
have some affinity with the principle expressed in the Lotus case that
restrictions on sovereignty ought not to be presumed.194 It seems that
sovereignty is conflated with national security, which in turn may be given a
textual gloss through the word "inherent," as reflected in Article 51.
According to the court, "it suffices for the Court to note that the very nature of
all nuclear weapons and the profound risks associated therewith are further
considerations to be borne in mind by states believing they can exercise a
nuclear response in self defense in accordance with the requirements of
proportionality."
195
The reader will recall that McDougal and Schlei relied upon the
principle of self-defense to justify the testing of the hydrogen bomb in the
South Pacific. 196 However, their argument was predicated upon the conception
of a global crisis, assumptions about the free world and tyranny, and
assumptions about the need for democracies to assert the right to defend
peace, security, and democratic values. Whatever the reality then, these same
considerations cannot be sustained in the post-Cold War world, where the
major powers are unlikely to use nuclear weapons intentionally. Modem
considerations surrounding nuclear weapons include whether irresponsible
terrorist groups and renegade states will use them and whether accidents,
technological failures, or simply human error may trigger a catastrophe.
In short, the invocation of the reasonableness standard in the context of
Article 51-based claims seems out of date. The court's analysis might have
been more informative if a more careful contextual appraisal of the world
order (as it relates to the distribution of power) and the threats to international
peace and security had been made. If this had been more carefully done, it
would have been difficult to divine a reasonable circumstance in which
"survival" would not actually mean mutually assured destruction. 197 In fact, it
194. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I. (ser. A.) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
195. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 245.
196. See McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 682-90.
197. See, e.g., Peter Weiss, The World Court Tackles the Fate of the Earth: An Introduction to
the ICJAdvisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 313, 325-26 (1997). Weiss states:
[T]he narrowness of the possible "extreme circumstance" exception becomes clear when
one considers the meaning of "the survival of a state." There are only two conditions in
which a state can be said to die: the physical destruction of all or virtually all of its
inhabitants, or the absorption of all or virtually all the functions of its statehood by
1999]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:485
is hard to imagine a nuclear weapons response as a rational self-defense
measure for survival except in the most abstract of circumstances.
198
The court also examines the scope of treaty law and customary
international law relating to the use of force and the role of nuclear
weapons. 199 The court's interpretation of treaty law is almost reminiscent of
the principles of strict construction.200 The interpretive question asked is
whether a treaty or other explicit textual basis in treaty law exists for
outlawing nuclear weapons on a universal basis. The court concludes that,
taken as a whole, the present treaty regime simply does not go that far.201 The
court points out that these treaties are crafted too specifically to support the
conclusion that there is a universal ban on the use, or threat of use, of nuclear
weapons, however desirable such an interpretation may be.202 In short, the
court does not find "any specific prohibition" in any of the specific treaties.20 3
Reisman believes that the court's opinion "raises doubts about the
cogency of the new [treaty] regime and revives the legitimacy of claims to use
nuclear weapons for exclusive national purposes.,2 04 He continues: "]f
international law does not hold definitely that the use of nuclear weapons by a
state in extreme circumstances of self defense is illegal, what is the court
saying to security specialists in states that feel they are under significant
threat?, 205 The conclusions of the court (in particular, Conclusion 2(E) of the
dispositif) tend to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons for discrete national
purposes in what the court described as "an extreme circumstance of self-
defence in which the very survival of a State may be at stake."2 6 Of course,
security specialists become security specialists because there are many
contingencies that affect what they mean by survival; often the self-perception
of survival can be a very convenient, if not self-serving, assertion. On the
other hand, in a world of heightened ethnic and national conflicts, few
national groups exist that do not believe that their survival is a constant
political problem. The questions are whether their efforts to acquire and
possibly use nuclear weapons for their survival do not severely compromise
another political entity. It stains credulity to conceive of any of the avowed nuclear
weapon states finding themselves in either of these scenarios.
Id
198. See WrrmER, supra note 43, at 35 (writing that "many of the scientists considered it futile
to try to preserve national security on a long-range basis through weapons of war... contend[ing] that
in the context of competing nations, the Bomb would eventually undermine national security and bring
the world to ruin").
199. See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. at 244-55.
200. The court's approach to interpretation in this context seems inconsistent with a more
generous theoretical goal-oriented approach to interpretation.
201. See Legality ofNuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.L at 253.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 248.
204. See Reisman, supra note 92, at 483.
205. Id.; see also PAiNE & McKNziB, supra note 132, at 3. The authors write that the U.S.
government is planning to "significantly expand its base of nuclear weapons knowledge by building
extensive above-ground experimental (AGEX) facilities for nuclear weapons physics and conducting
underground high-explosive experiments with plutonium and other nuclear materials at the Nevada Test
Site." Id. The government is also planning measures to develop and upgrade its nuclear stockpile. See id.
206. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. at 266.
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the planet's survival, and whether, in such cases, security can be achieved by
less risky and more reasonable strategies of self-defense. The full implications
of the court's holding might better be appreciated if the court's specific
language is again quoted in full:
[I]n view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined above
by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it
cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival
would be at stake.
20 7
The opinion of the court and, in particular, the specific conclusion will
undoubtedly satisfy few discerning observers of international, law and
proponents of the court's role in law's development. For lawyers who see a
more circumscribed role for international law and, in particular, a limited role
for international lawmaking in the strict juridical sense of judge-made law, the
court's opinion simply goes too far. It trenches upon the sensitive issue of
judicial self-limitation in an area in which the stakes, in an immediate sense,
are charged with high politics.
On the other hand, there are those who believe that the nuclear weapons
issue is one of the most central and defining questions about the being and
becoming of humanity, and that central to these questions are the values that
fundamentally secure humanity and world order. These values reflect deeply
upon the history and tradition of international law and are reflected most
concretely in the general constitutional scheme of the Charter system, explicit
normative guidance of which is to be found in the very preamble and
statement of purposes of this organizing instrument of world order. Still a
third view is possible. This view sees, in the court's careful analysis of the
corpus of substantive law that is affected by the nuclear weapons problem,
that there is a great deal in this conversation that is amenable to the reasoned
elaboration of the law. The question is: Is such reasoned elaboration a
meaningful contribution to a problem that is usually communicated and
discussed in the most non-transparent ways? This, of course, is characteristic
of most matters that fall within the domain of claims to national security as
they are often rationalized under the self-defense principle of Article 51.
The ICJ's contribution may be seen as a way of partially preempting the
process of how we might responsibly think about nuclear weapons and what
we might do to secure their eventual elimination. From this point of view, the
decision reflects a combination of both prudence and an appreciable moral
sensibility that informs the technical legal analysis. We cannot after all
completely separate strict law from the dictates of conscience and decency.
The specific paragraph, which I have quoted in full, contains a statement that
the court cannot unequivocally reach a conclusion about "the legality or
illegality of the use of nuclear weapons ... in an extreme circumstance of
207. Id. at 263.
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self-defense,, 20 8 in the context of a survival situation. This is from a doctrinal
point of view an effort to acknowledge the problems of sovereignty, security,
and self-defense.
Perhaps the problem posed in the statement should be teased out further
to determine exactly the contextual indicators of an extreme circumstance as
well as the indicators of the notion "very survival., 20 9 These indicators must
be evaluated against the risks that nuclear weapons pose for human survival.
Perhaps then the notion of sovereignty might well be subordinated to the
notion of the self-defense, so to speak, of the planet as a whole as well as the
very survival of the planet as a whole. From a pragmatic point of view, it may
still be the case that the sovereign members of the nuclear club still wish to
retain a residuum of reliance on nuclear weapons as a supposed deterrent.
However, this rationale seems to be getting weaker and weaker in light of the
regime of nonproliferation and the international obligations that envision the
subordination of sovereignty to the special regime of nonproliferation.
D. The Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Weeramantry
Judge Weeramantry's dissenting opinion is an illustration of Grotian
jurisprudence at its finest. At the heart of the opinion is the principle that
nuclear arsenals are simply incompatible with the idea of law, legality, and
reasoned elaboration. It may thus be of value to assay some aspects of the
Weeramantry dissent in terms of the more general issue concerning the future
role of the international lawyer. This issue is related to a central question
implicit in this Essay; namely, how far and to what extent lawyer
interventions will improve our understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
in the context of changing world order patterns. This question is a matter that
deeply implicates the fundamental values of the role, function, identity, and
responsibility of a learned profession. Additionally, what effective legal
strategies can be employed to secure the agreed-upon objective of complete
nuclear disarmament and to secure a clear, legal, and moral basis for holding
that the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons is quite simply a violation of
international law?
In this context, it seems there are two vitally important technical matters
that international lawyers must resolve among themselves. Having done so,
the international lawyers must then find the means to communicate these
resolutions to both the political and the relevant technological and scientific
communities. The first matter concerns the scope of international law. Is the
regime of nuclear weapons subject only to the law of the lex specialis, or are
there broader sources of law that must inform this critical legal conversation?
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, it is strongly urged that
the range of applicable international law is not confined to the lex specialis of




1. The international law applicable generally to armed conflicts-the jus in bello,
sometimes referred to as the "humanitarian law of war."
2. The jus ad bellum-the law governing the right of States to go to war. This law is
expressed in the United Nations Charter and related customary law.
3. The lex specialis-the international legal obligations that relate specifically to nuclear
arms and weapons of mass destruction.
4. The whole corpus of international law that governs State obligations and rights
generally, which may affect nuclear weapons policy in particular circumstances.
5. National law, constitutional and statutory, that may apply to decisions on nuclear
weapons by national authorities.2 10
Both the majority opinion and Judge Weeramantry's dissenting opinion
have embraced a broader view of what international law is, and, therefore,
have in effect sanctioned a broader role for the international lawyer in world
order matters. It is obvious, however, that Judge Weeramantry's list of
"sources" suggests that we must broaden our "sources" base for international
adjudication to keep abreast of the critical problems of world order amenable
to judicial interventions. I would suggest that this is more than simply giving
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute a generous construction as to the relevant,
authoritative sources of international law.211 It may be that we are also in
search of a more useful theory about the sources of international law. W.
Michael Reisman, for example, anticipated just such an eventuality in his
piece, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, in which he
sought to provide a practical perspective drawn from communications theory
about how international law is functionally created.12 Professor Reisman
suggested that attention be given to the identity of both communicator and
target audience.213 He also suggested that, from an observer's view, careful
appraisal be given to the "authority signal," the "controlling intention," and
the "policy content" of a relevant flow of communications.214 These
theoretical ideas may find fertile ground for reflection in practical contexts of
international decision-making. This, of course, impacts upon how broadly or
narrowly the lawyer role is conceived.
The second central issue is that of interpretation. Assuming arguendo
that Judge Weeramantry is correct about the breadth of the sources of
international law relevant to the problem, what kinds of explicit, normative
guidance can the interpreter invoke regarding the specific prescription and
application of international law? Here the U.N. Charter preamble, as an
210. Id. at 443 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
211. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
212. See Reisman, supra note 60, at 101.
213. See id. at 107.
214. Id. at 108 (citing Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function
in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PuB. ORD. 249,
250 (1980)).
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instrument of goal guidance as well as goal clarification, is most useful and
insightful.
In his dissenting opinion, for example, Judge Weeramantry sought to
ground the problem in the context of "six keynote concepts" which embody
the global community's fundamental expectations about global constitutive
and public order priorities.215 These concepts are vital if the interpretation of
international law is to be guided by explicit standards of normative
understanding. In short, the interpretation of international law (i.e., its specific
prescription and application) may be rootless, arbitrary, and even quixotic if it
is not subject to explicit standards of normative guidance, which are expressed
in concrete terms in the U.N. Charter taken as a whole.
The opening of the preamble expresses the first standard-that the
Charter's authority is rooted in the perspectives of all members of the global
community, i.e., the peoples. This is indicated by the words, "[w]e the peoples
of the United Nations."216 Thus, the authority for the international rule of law,
and its power to review and supervise the nuclear weapons problem is an
authority not rooted in abstractions like "sovereignty, .... elite," or "ruling
class," but in the actual perspectives of the people of the world community.
This means that the peoples' goals, expressed through appropriate fora,
including the United Nations, governments, as well as public opinion, are
critical indicators of the "principle of humanity" and the "dictates of public
conscience" as they relate to the conditions of war (methods and means).
The Charter's second key concept embraces the high purpose of saving
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.2 17 The drafters clearly did not
envision nuclear war in reference to the concept of war here. Nonetheless, as
the passage contemplates the destructiveness of war, an enhanced
technological capacity for destructive weapons would enhance the relevance
of this provision, not restrict its scope. This reflects a reasonable legal
interpretation.
The third keynote concept is the reference to the "dignity and worth of
the human person., 218 In blunt terms, the eradication of millions of human
beings with a single weapon hardly values the dignity or worth of the human
person. What is of cardinal legal, political, and moral import is the idea that
international law based on the law of the Charter be interpreted to enhance the
dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be complicit in
the destruction of the core values of human dignity.
The fourth keynote concept in the preamble is emphatically anti-
imperialist. It holds that the equal rights of all nations must be respected.
Nuclear power institutionalizes hegemony (nuclear umbrellas) and
destabilizes interstate relations as states face the "need" to possess their
nuclear arsenal in order to deter the other states from contemplating the
deployment or use of their own arsenal.
215. See Legality ofNuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 443 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).




The fifth keynote in the Charter preamble refers to the obligation to
respect international law based not only on treaty commitments, but also on
"other sources of international law."2 19 The entire framework of nuclear
weapons perspectives and operations cannot proceed outside of the very idea
of "law," or more precisely, the law of human survival that must be the
foundational precept of modem international law.
The sixth keynote point in the preamble of the Charter contains a deeply
rooted expectation of progress, improved standards of living, and enhanced
domains of freedom. Extinction or the prospect of extinction of the human
species is hardly consistent.
These standards may influence the strategies of legal argument and legal
justification concerning the legality of nuclear weapons. One strategy would
be to take the facts and logic of nuclear weapons and to show in light of these
keynote concepts, after the fashion of natural lawyers, that there is nothing
reasonable in the threat of the possible extinction of the entire eco-social
process. Another stratagem may be to give a cautious assessment of the
available corpus of law, in light of the keynote concepts, and to appeal for
caution and seriousness if states feel compelled to have recourse to nuclear
weapons, in conduct and operations that are on their face ostensibly
incompatible with those keynote expectations. A third approach would be to
simply acknowledge that the issue of nuclear weapons is sui generis. To do
this, one would have to ignore the normative guidance of the keynote concepts
and have a great deal more faith in what states have actually achieved so far.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of the lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
before the ICJ has allowed the court the opportunity to enlarge and focus the
legal discourse on a vital issue of world order. In so doing, the court has
established a juridical structure for the problem. This structure secures a
process of reasoned elaboration that is more in keeping with the Grotian
tradition than the tradition of state-dominated positivism. I believe that a more
generous interpretation of the relevant sources, including the treaty
obligations, and a highly restrictive view of reasonable self-defense, will
provide us with a better working picture of how we must proceed
expeditiously to clear the Earth of the menace of nuclear weapons. A still
more realistic picture of the legal character of the problem of nuclear weapons
emerges from Judge Weeramantry's dissent. Quite simply, nuclear weapons
point to a legal limit on the capacity for universal destruction. They cannot be
reconciled with the fundamental keynote expectations of the U.N. Charter and
modem international law. They are or should be unlawful.
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